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The war on terrorism waged by the United States is in its 17th year. To a 
large extent, it has defined three very different presidencies and no end is 
in sight. In the time since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the 
initial shock has gradually given way to a new normalcy. The time seems 
right to assess the US’s approach to combating terrorism – an assessment 
this study attempts to provide. 
A key finding of this report is that the global war on terror is not only 
continuing, but that it is also becoming increasingly difficult to end. What 
began as a secret war is now firmly established US policy, both legally and 
institutionally. 
In the early years of the global war on terror, US methods were strongly 
criticized by Europe’s governments. This criticism has now largely ceased. 
Detention without a trial, targeted killings, mass surveillance – all of this 
is at least tolerated, and in some cases even supported. 
This development is problematic in several respects. Its consequences 
include the systematic erosion of human and civil rights; the concentration 
of decision-making power in the hands of the executive at the expense of the 
separation of powers principle; and the expansion of the national security 
state. Since victory is unlikely, the question of whether to continue support-
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Issues and Conclusions 
From Exception to Normalcy 
The United States and the War on 
Terrorism 
The war on terrorism waged by the United States 
(US) is in its 17th year. To a large extent, it has 
defined three very different presidencies and no end 
is in sight. In the time since the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, the initial shock has gradually 
given way to a new normalcy, and the time seems 
right to assess how the US’s approach to combating 
terrorism has affected the rule of law, democracy, 
and human rights over almost the past two decades. 
Such an assessment is advisable for three reasons. 
First, the policies for combating terrorism have under-
gone a number of changes. The methods have been 
continually changed, new ones introduced, and ex-
isting ones abolished; the legal framework has been 
adapted; and the fight has been extended to new 
terrorist groups. This study should help in keeping 
track of the many twists and turns and to clarify the 
current situation. Second, the methods being used 
to combat terrorism have since found imitators. Not 
only do autocrats of all kinds justify human rights 
abuses and the persecution of political opponents 
as being anti-terror measures, European democracies 
have not remained unaffected by these changes 
either. Whereas in the early years following 9/11 
European governments had repeatedly and clearly 
voiced criticisms of some of the controversial 
methods used for fighting the war, these have now 
largely ceased. Detentions without trials, targeted 
killings, indiscriminate surveillance – all of this is at 
least tolerated, if not supported. Moreover, European 
governments are following the US example in many 
respects. In France, a constitutional state of emergency 
was in force for almost two years after a series of ter-
rorist attacks in 2015; subsequently, many of the 
powers then issued for the police and military have 
been permanently enshrined in a new anti-terror law. 
Britain had one of its citizens killed in Iraq using a 
drone attack without even attempting to provide any 
legal justification. And in almost all European coun-
tries, the security agencies are constantly demanding 
new powers to monitor communications. All this 
leads to a normalization of problematic practices 
without sufficient discussions of the consequences. 
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Third, the presidency of Donald Trump has given 
the issue of the fight against terrorism new urgency. 
Trump inherited from his predecessors a remarkable 
degree of power in the field of security policy. In con-
trast to Barack Obama, however, there is no guaran-
tee that he will deal with it cautiously. There is much 
talk of Trump’s control over the metaphorical red 
button of the US nuclear arsenal. On the other hand, 
his power over the joysticks that steer Predator drones 
equipped with Hellfire missiles attracts relatively 
little attention. 
A key finding of this report is that the global war 
on terror is not only continuing, but that it is also 
becoming increasingly difficult to end. What began 
as a secret war of a (strongly ideological) presidency is 
now firmly established as US policy, both legally and 
institutionally. The fight against terrorism by military 
means continues, with the aim of preventing terrorist 
attacks entirely. The logic of war and prevention has 
led the US to take a number of controversial measures 
after 9/11. In the context of a partially secret deten-
tion and interrogation program, alleged terrorists 
were abducted, arrested, and tortured in order to ob-
tain information about planned attacks. The secret 
prisons are now closed and torture has ceased, but the 
practice of detaining suspects in Guantánamo for an 
unlimited period without trials continues. Targeted 
killings of terrorist suspects, often by drones, have 
been expanded due to greater technical possibilities 
and are a rarely questioned part of this war. When 
the public learned of the indiscriminate surveillance 
of the communications and online activities of Ameri-
cans and foreigners and its questionable legal basis, 
there were some minor corrections. However, the far-
reaching powers of the intelligence agencies remained 
largely untouched and were subsequently legalized. 
Although each of these areas – detentions, targeted 
killings, and surveillance – has its own dynamics 
and individual measures have continuously evolved, 
the overall picture reveals continuity. 
This development is problematic in several re-
spects. Its consequences include the systematic ero-
sion of human and civil rights; the concentration of 
decision-making power in the hands of the executive 
at the expense of the separation of powers principle; 
and the expansion of the national security state. The 
national security establishment requires considerable 
resources and has itself become a powerful actor in 
US security policy as a type of “intelligence industrial 
complex.” Despite some policy revisions and the dis-
continuation of the worst excesses – especially the 
use of torture – the measure of what is considered 
acceptable in the name of security has permanently 
shifted over the last two decades. Legal and moral 
norms that were long regarded as undisputable in 
the US have suffered lasting damage. 
The effectiveness of the war on terror remains dis-
puted. The aim of the present analysis is not to meas-
ure the war’s effectiveness because, in order to do so, 
it would be necessary to argue counterfactually as to 
whether there would have been less terrorism today 
if the war had not been conducted in this way – a 
methodologically questionable undertaking. How-
ever, it seems doubtful whether we are closer to the 
goal of defeating terrorism today than in 2001. Since 
victory is unlikely, the question of whether to con-
tinue on the present course is all the more urgent. 
There have been a few changes in US policies that 
have provoked criticisms from European governments 
after 9/11, however the issue has lost urgency. Be-
cause Europe held President Obama in high regard, 
he was not under the same pressure to justify himself 
as his predecessor, although he continued many of 
the controversial measures. Now, with Donald Trump 
in the White House, European governments have 
other concerns and do not want to open up another 
area of conflict with Washington. But on their own, 
US practices will not change, and the longer German 
and European officials remain silent about them, the 
more that creeping normalization prevents the pos-
sibility of a policy change. 
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“We will […] unite the civilized world against Radical Islamic Terror-
ism, which we will eradicate completely from the face of the Earth.” 
Donald Trump, 20 January 2017 
“We have to be mindful of James Madison’s warning that ‘No nation 
could preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare.’ […] This 
war [on terror], like all wars, must end. That’s what history advises. 
That’s what our democracy demands.” 
Barack Obama, 23 May 2013 
“It [the war on terror] is different than the Gulf War was, in the sense 
that it may never end. At least, not in our lifetime.” 
Dick Cheney, October 2001 
 
In the nationalist worldview of President Donald 
Trump, the threat of terrorism occupies a central 
place. In his typically provocative manner, Trump has 
contemplated all kinds of drastic measures to combat 
terrorism. He told the press that the controversial 
interrogation technique of waterboarding is an effec-
tive means of obtaining information.1 His plan to 
revive secret prisons operated by the Central Intel-
ligence Agency (CIA) was the subject of a leaked draft 
Executive Order.2 Trump has no intention of closing 
the prison at Guantánamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba and 
is openly considering bringing new prisoners there. 
As usual, Trump has not put everything he con-
templated aloud into action, but it is also not all just 
 
1 “Transcript: ABC News Anchor David Muir Interviews 
President Trump”, ABC News, 25 January 2017, http:// 
abcnews.go.com/Politics/transcript-abc-news-anchor-david-
muir-interviews-president/story?id=45047602. During his 
election campaign, he also said he would not only go after 
terrorists, but also their families. See Tom LoBianco, “Donald 
Trump on Terrorists: ‘Take Out Their Families’”, cnn.com, 
3 December 2015, https://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/02/politics/ 
donald-trump-terrorists-families/. 
2 Charlie Savage, “White House Pulls Back from Bid to Re-
open C.I.A. ‘Black Site’ Prisons”, New York Times, 4 February 
2017, https://nyti.ms/2kApFS9. 
rhetoric. One of his first official acts was to order an 
operation of special forces against an Al-Qaeda cell 
in Yemen; 14 people – including several civilians – 
were killed in the operation.3 The president is said to 
have declared Yemen and Somalia “areas of active 
hostilities,” and thus relaxed the criteria for the use 
of deadly force there.4 The controversial practice of 
the CIA operating its own fleet of armed drones 
to carry out targeted killings was not phased out as 
planned, but expanded. As the agency’s new director, 
Trump appointed Gina Haspel, who ran a secret CIA 
prison in George W. Bush’s first term. The fact that 
alleged terrorists were also tortured there attests to 
Haspel’s strength, according to Trump. 
The methods for fighting the war against terrorism, 
which has now lasted for more than 17 years, have 
been repeatedly adapted. However, there is continuity 
in two respects. First, the terrorist threat has brought 
preventive action to the fore. Because deterrence is 
ineffective against terrorists who are prepared to sac-
rifice their own lives, the investigation and prosecu-
 
3 Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Commando Killed in Yemen in 
Trump’s First Counterterrorism Operation”, New York Times, 
29 January 2017, https://nyti.ms/2jETG1Q. 
4 See section “Targeted killing”, p. 22. 
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tion of crimes already committed does not prevent 
future attacks. However, since the electorate demands 
prevention, law enforcement and the intelligence 
services often turn to methods that undermine con-
stitutional principles and human rights. Second, in 
certain parts of the world, the struggle against terror-
ism is conducted by military means. The term “war 
on terrorism” is not a metaphor; rather, the war para-
digm is the legal and moral prerequisite for the use 
of military means, including lethal force. The appli-
cation of preventive measures and the war paradigm 
have led to a lasting shift in the perception of what 
seems legitimate in the fight against terrorism. This 
has been the common denominator of all US admin-
istrations since 9/11. 
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Immediately after the terrorist attacks on the New 
York World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001, 
the US government was concerned that further 
attacks were already underway. Those responsible for 
preventing them acted under the impression of an 
imminent threat and critical time pressure, leading 
Congress to give President Bush largely free rein in his 
choice of means. Both the authorization by Congress 
and the action by the executive on that basis outlived 
the immediate shock after 9/11 and still form the 
basis of the war against terrorism today. 
A resolution authorizing the 
war on terrorism 
The legal basis for the war on terrorism is the Authori-
zation for Use of Military Force (AUMF), which was 
adopted as a joint resolution by both chambers of 
Congress on September 14, 2001, and signed by Presi-
dent Bush on September 18, 2001.5 The AUMF author-
izes the president “to use all necessary and appro-
priate force against those nations, organizations, or 
persons he determines planned, authorized, commit-
ted, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 
9/11, or harbored such organizations or persons.” 
That this force was authorized not only against states 
but also against organizations and individuals was a 
novelty.6 The resolution sanctioned the military inter-
vention in Afghanistan, which was initially aimed at 
 
5 Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed 
Forces Against Those Responsible for the Recent Attacks Launched 
Against the United States, Public Law 107-40, 18 September 2001. 
See also Daniel Bethlehem, “Self-Defense Against an Immi-
nent or Actual Armed Attack by Nonstate Actors”, American 
Journal of International Law 106, no. 4 (2012): 770–77. 
6 Richard F. Grimmet, Authorization for Use of Military Force in 
Response to the 9/11 Attacks (P.L. 107-40): Legislative History, CRS 
Report for Congress RS22357 (Washington, D.C.: Congres-
sional Research Service, updated 16 January 2007). 
overthrowing the Taliban regime, eliminating 
Al-Qaeda, and capturing or killing the backers of the 
9/11 attack. 
But the power to use military force was not limited 
to Afghanistan or certain countries or areas of opera-
tion. The war on terrorism was global from the very 
beginning.7 The decision as to who or what was a 
legitimate target was primarily a matter for the presi-
dent. In a speech to Congress, Bush declared that the 
war would continue until every global terrorist group 
was found and defeated.8 
 
7 In 2005, the Bush administration, initiated by the Depart-
ment of Defense, attempted to replace the term “global war 
on terror” (GWAT) with “global struggle against violent ex-
tremism” (G-SAVE). The Obama administration also tried to 
avoid the term “war on terror” but continued to talk about 
the war against Al-Qaeda and its associates. Eric Schmitt 
and Thom Shanker, “US Officials Retool Slogan for Terror 
War”, New York Times, 26 July 2005, http://nyti.ms/1LjBiUK; 
Jay Solomon, “US Drops ‘War on Terror’ Phrase, Clinton 
Says”, Wall Street Journal, 31 March 2009, http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/SB123845123690371231; Trevor B. McCrisken, 
“Ten Years On: Obama’s War on Terrorism in Rhetoric and 
Practice”, International Affairs 87, no. 4 (2011): 781–801. 
Donald Trump uses the term “radical Islamic terrorism”. 
Peter Holley, “‘Radical Islamic Terrorism’: Three Words That 
Separate Trump from Most of Washington”, Washington Post, 
1 March 2017, http://wapo.st/2mCfBpR?. 
8 “On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed 
an act of war against our country […]. Our war on terror 
begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not 
end until every terrorist group of global reach has been 
found, stopped and defeated.” George W. Bush, “Address 
to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People”, 
20 September 2001, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives. 
gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html. 
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A small circle of decision-makers 
A small group of confidants played an outsized role 
in deciding important aspects of how to conduct 
the war on terror. In addition to Vice President Dick 
Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and 
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, a circle 
of advisers who called themselves the “War Council” 
was particularly influential. It consisted of the White 
House Counsel, Alberto Gonzales; his deputy Tim 
Flanigan; Vice President Cheney’s Chief of Staff and 
Counsel, David Addington; the Department of De-
fense Legal Counsel, William “Jim” Haynes II; and 
John Yoo, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General and 
the number two at the Justice Department’s Office 
of Legal Counsel (OLC) – the institution whose inter-
pretations of US laws are authoritative and binding 
on the entire executive branch. Sometimes the mem-
bers coordinated among themselves before involving 
other staff of relevant departments. At other times, 
they dispensed entirely with the usual interagency 
process, which normally involves a large number of 
staff.9 
The people included in the War Council were 
likely also selected because of their extreme positions 
regarding the president’s powers in the system of 
checks and balances. Vice President Cheney and 
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld believed that the presi-
dent enjoyed almost unlimited authority in matters 
of national security, based on the idea of a “unitary 
executive.” After the Watergate scandal in the early 
1970s, Congress’s oversight powers over the executive 
were strengthened. The revelation that under Presi-
dent Richard Nixon the White House had violated 
numerous laws and, in particular, abused the law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies for its own 
political purposes led to a number of legislative 
reforms. They culminated in 1980 in the adoption of 
a law requiring newly established Intelligence Com-
mittees in both chambers of Congress to be briefed 
about any covert operations by the CIA. The sup-
porters of the unitary executive model rejected such 
an oversight role by Congress as being unconsti-
tutional.10 John Yoo argued in an OLC legal memo-
 
9 See Jack L. Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency: Law and Judg-
ment inside the Bush Administration (New York, NY: W. W. 
Norton & Company, 2007), 22. 
10 Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency, 85f.: “Addington had 
no such instincts. To the contrary, long before 9/11 he and 
his boss had set out to reverse what they saw as Congress’s 
randum that the president’s role as Commander-in-
Chief allowed him to ignore existing laws such as the 
prohibition of torture.11 The general perception of 
threat after 9/11 and the recourse to secret measures 
enabled the supporters of the unitary executive to 
implement their extreme positions into the powers 
of the presidency, initially without much resistance. 
Covert operations as a 
defining characteristic 
President Bush made covert operations a central 
part of the fight against terrorism.12 On September 
17, 2001, he signed a secret order giving the CIA far-
reaching powers to capture or kill terrorists.13 For this 
purpose, which was named Operation Greystone, the 
 
illegitimate decades-long intrusions on ‘unitary’ executive 
power.” 
11 “Even if an interrogation method arguably were to vio-
late Section 2340A [‘committing or attempting to commit 
torture’], the statute would be unconstitutional if it imper-
missibly encroached on the President’s constitutional power 
to conduct a military campaign. As Commander-in-Chief, the 
President has the constitutional authority to order interroga-
tions of enemy combatants to gain intelligence information 
concerning the military plans of the enemy.” See Jay S. 
Bybee (Assistant Attorney General), “Memorandum for 
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President”, 1 August 
2002, in The Torture Papers. The Road to Abu Ghraib, ed. Karen J. 
Greenberg and Joshua L. Dratel (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2005), 172–217 (200). 
12 To this day, there is no official public account of these 
activities. Certain aspects of it, such as the CIA’s so-called 
detention and interrogation program, have been the subject 
of official investigations and government reports. Through 
them and the work of investigative journalists and human 
rights organizations, as well as through investigations by 
the EU, a relatively extensive picture has now emerged, 
partly complemented by accounts of former government 
employees. This study is based on this range of sources. 
13 According to the law, covert operations require a Memo-
randum of Notification by the president, including a presi-
dential finding that the operation is in the national security 
interest of the United States. See James M. McCormick, Ameri-
can Foreign Policy and Process (Belmont, California: Thomson 
Wadsworth, 2004); Robert Chesney, “Military-Intelligence 
Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 50 Debate”, 
Journal of National Security Law and Policy 5 (2012): 539–629 
(University of Texas Law, Public Law Research Paper no. 212), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1945392. 
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CIA received $1 billion of additional funding.14 In 
contrast to previous covert programs, the president 
did not authorize each operation individually. In-
stead, he delegated the approval of specific opera-
tions, including targeted killings, to the head of the 
CIA Counterterrorism Center.15 Details were kept 
secret from the public. Vice President Cheney said in 
a television interview that, in order to succeed, the 
intelligence services would have to work in the dark, 
and without much discussion of their methods.16 In 
Congress only the leadership of each party and the 
chairmanship and ranking members of the relevant 
committees were informed, likely only on the most 
general terms (see section “The detention and inter-
rogation program,” p. 13). Only years later did the 
public find out exactly what the new powers in-
cluded. 
At the initiative of Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, 
not only were the CIA but also the military’s special 
forces increasingly called upon. The special forces 
of the various branches of the armed forces were 
expanded and given greater autonomy in carrying 
out operations under the Joint Special Operations 
Command (JSOC). After 9/11, the number of troops 
under JSOC increased from 30,000 to approximately 
70,000.17 Over time, the CIA and military special 
 
14 Dana Priest and William M. Arkin, Top Secret America. 
The Rise of the New American Security State (New York, NY: Little, 
Brown and Company, 2011), 6. 
15 Jeremy Scahill, Dirty Wars. The World Is a Battlefield 
(London: Nation Books, 2013), 20. In the words of the later 
deputy CIA director Michael Morell: “Never before had the 
Agency had as much latitude to conduct paramilitary opera-
tions, and it used those authorities aggressively to protect 
the country.” Michael Morell and Bill Harlow, The Great War 
of Our Time: The CIA’s Fight Against Terrorism. From Al Qa’ida to 
ISIS (New York, NY: Twelve, 2015), 73. 
16 “We also have to work, though, sort of the dark side, 
if you will. We’ve got to spend time in the shadows in the 
intelligence world. A lot of what needs to be done here will 
have to be done quietly, without any discussion, using 
sources and methods that are available to our intelligence 
agencies, if we’re going to be successful. That’s the world 
these folks operate in, and so it’s going to be vital for us 
to use any means at our disposal, basically, to achieve our 
objective.” Dick Cheney, “The Vice President Appears on 
Meet the Press with Tim Russert”, 16 September 2001, 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/ 
news-speeches/speeches/print/vp20010916.html. 
17 Mark Danner et al., “In the Darkness of Dick Cheney”, 
The New York Review of Books, 6 March 2014, http://www. 
nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/mar/06/darkness-dick-
forces have become increasingly interlinked in con-
ducting operations – a phenomenon discussed in 
the legal literature under the term “convergence” 
(see section “The National Security State and the 
Power of the Executive,” p. 29). 
Rising criticism leads to some 
limited reversals 
As the public’s knowledge of the administration’s 
extreme measures grew, so did the opposition to it. 
The criticism was most pronounced with respect to 
the conditions governing the detention, treatment, 
and interrogation of terrorist suspects – it was in 
this area that the resulting reversals were most sig-
nificant. US courts claimed jurisdiction over the 
prisoners against the will of the White House, regard-
less of where they were held. Prisoners’ complaints 
against their detention and the conditions of their 
imprisonment, as well as trials of those accused of 
terrorism, led to a series of rulings that gradually re-
stricted the government’s flexibility and strengthened 
prisoners’ rights. As the systematic nature of the abuse 
became known, Congress also intervened to ban vio-
lent practices. This was not a straightforward process; 
rather, over many years, there was a continuous tug-
of-war between the executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches over the appropriate laws regarding the 
treatment of potential and actual terrorists. The ad-
ministration was forced to give in on crucial points; 
the situation of the prisoners at the end of the Bush 
era was different from the one shortly after 9/11. But 
despite the changes, the rule of law and human rights 
standards remained significantly lower than before 
the beginning of the global war on terror. President 
Obama’s ascent to the presidency made little differ-
ence in this regard. 
One crucial difference between Obama and his 
predecessor was that the new president unequivocally 
condemned and ended the system of secret prisons 
and torture. But even under Obama, indefinite deten-
tions without a trial – whether in Guantánamo or 
elsewhere – trials by military commissions with more 
limited rights for the accused, and the possibility of 
the “extraordinary rendition” of alleged terrorists to 
third countries continued. 
 
cheney/; Andrew Fieckert, US Special Operations Forces (SOF): 
Background and Issues for Congress, CRS Report for Congress 
7-5700 (Washington, D.C.: CRS, 8 April 2016). 
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Obama’s criticism was less about the 
human rights violations than about 
the fact that Bush had acted without 
sufficient legal basis. 
On the question of government surveillance, the 
public’s lack of knowledge of the extent of the gov-
ernment’s measures long prevented any critical dis-
cussions. Obama’s inauguration had no consequences 
here, at first. In 2013, with the publication of internal 
documents by former intelligence contractor Edward 
Snowden, the government’s secret surveillance author-
ities became public, and the legal justifications for 
this claim to power were questioned. Only now did 
political protests emerge, which led to some correc-
tions. 
The policy of targeted killings, on the other hand, 
never triggered a major public outcry, even after the 
Obama administration publicly admitted it. That 
the government used drones to kill alleged terrorists 
had never been a real secret. Rather, classifying such 
measures as “covert operations” allowed them to 
avoid defining clear criteria for the legality of indi-
vidual operations and of having to assume respon-
sibility for civilian victims. At the same time, the US 
drone strikes were kept secret in order to conceal the 
fact that allied governments such as Pakistan and 
Yemen tacitly tolerated them. The expansion of the 
drone program under Obama also provoked little 
political resistance, despite numerous critical cam-
paigns by human rights organizations. 
The Obama administration not only continued 
the controversial measures, but also institutionalized 
them more firmly. Whereas the Bush administration 
had introduced some methods in violation of existing 
laws and justified them – if they were justified at all 
– as being contained within the inherent powers of 
the executive, Obama put his policy on a more solid 
institutional basis. He established new decision-
making procedures within the executive, had new 
justifications for the legality of measures drawn up 
and, with the involvement of Congress, succeeded in 
creating a new statutory basis for existing practices. 
Journalist Charlie Savage convincingly shows that, 
from the outset, Obama’s criticisms of Bush’s ap-
proach to the war on terror was not so much on sub-
stantive issues. Instead of condemning civil or human 
rights violations, he lamented the fact that Bush acted 
on his own – without a legal basis – and bypassed 
the Constitution and the system of checks and bal-
ances. Accordingly, Obama did not fundamentally 
question Bush’s anti-terrorist policy after taking 
office; rather, he created a more sophisticated legal 
justification, often through new justifications for 
existing practices.18 
President Trump’s policy does not yet have a clear 
outline. On the one hand, the terrorist threat was 
a central issue in his election campaign, and on the 
other hand, he seems to be paying more attention 
to relations between the major powers. However, his 
statements have made it clear that he lacks any con-
cern for the situation of a permanent state of war. 
Beyond rhetoric, continuity also seems to predomi-
nate under Trump; the thrust of his early actions 
seems to indicate an escalation rather than a limi-
tation of the war. At the same time, his ignorance 
and lack of interest in the details of policy give the 
national security bureaucracy every opportunity to 
pursue its own agenda. 
 
18 Charlie Savage, Power Wars. Inside Obama’s Post-9/11 Presi-
dency (New York, NY, Boston, and London: Little, Brown and 
Company, 2015). 
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As more time following the 9/11 attacks passed, some 
measures were reversed (such as the use of torture), 
some mitigated (such as the inadvertent surveillance 
of US citizens), some maintained (such as indefinite 
detention without trial), and some expanded (such as 
targeted killings using drones). 
The detention and interrogation program 
On February 7, 2002, President Bush stated in a memo-
randum that the war on terrorism created a “new 
paradigm” to which the Geneva Conventions did not 
apply.19 On the basis of the secret directive signed by 
Bush on September 17, 2001, the CIA established a 
program to capture individuals “posing a continuing, 
serious threat of violence or death to U.S. persons and 
interests or planning terrorist activities.” Interroga-
tion methods were not mentioned, but the directive 
formed the basis for the so-called High Value De-
 
19 According to the memo, the Third Geneva Convention 
was not applicable to the conflict with Al-Qaeda, because 
the network was neither a state nor “a High Contracting 
Party to Geneva”. Common Article 3 of the Convention was 
neither applicable to Al-Qaeda nor to the Taliban, because 
the conflict was international in character, whereas Article 3 
only applied to non-international conflicts. Neither were 
the Taliban and Al-Qaeda as unlawful combatants entitled 
to prisoner-of-war status according to Article 4. The White 
House, “Memorandum by the President”, 7 February 2002, 
in The Torture Papers, ed. Greenberg and Dratel (see note 11), 
134f. Especially Secretary of State Colin Powell and his legal 
advisor William H. Taft IV had contradicted this assessment. 
Bush, however, followed his Attorney General, John Ash-
croft, who was also supported by legal advisers Alberto Gon-
zales (White House) and William Haynes (Pentagon), both 
members of the War Council. On the controversy over the 
applicability of the Geneva Conventions, see the memoranda 
of the relevant actors in The Torture Papers, ed. Greenberg and 
Dratel (see note 11), 38–133. 
tainee Program.20 This gave the intelligence agencies 
maximum flexibility to capture, transport, detain, or 
transfer prisoners from one country to another out-
side of normal processes and, if necessary, without 
the consent of the host country. The CIA created a 
system of secret prisons spread over several countries 
in which prisoners from whom the US expected im-
portant information in the war on terror (“high-value 
detainees”) were detained and interrogated without 
any legal protections and had no contact with the 
outside world.21 
Torture in the name of fighting terrorism 
Not only CIA prisoners, but also military prisoners 
were held in locations without access to US courts. 
They were either detained in military prisons in 
Afghanistan or taken to Guantánamo Bay Naval Base. 
The CIA requested instructions from the government 
on which interrogation methods were allowed. The 
CIA staff in the field and the decision-makers on 
the War Council apparently quickly agreed that the 
brutal interrogation techniques would be permitted 
in the quest for intelligence. 
The OLC at the Department of Justice prepared a 
series of memorandums with the aim of giving the 
 
20 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee 
Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation 
Program, 9 December 2014 (S. Rpt. 113–288), xviii, 11. The 
Memorandum of Notification itself is still classified. 
21 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study 
of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Pro-
gram, xviii, 11. Also see Stephen Grey, Ghost Plane: The True 
Story of the CIA Torture Program (New York, NY: Holtzbrinck 
Publishers, 2006); a map with the location and duration of 
operation of these “black sites” is available at Matt Apuzzo, 
Sheri Fink, and James Risen, “How U.S. Torture Left a Legacy 
of Damaged Minds”, New York Times, 9 October 2016, https:// 
nyti.ms/2k5yq2W. 
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government maximum flexibility in dealing with 
prisoners. Its lawyers came up with new interpreta-
tions of existing laws to (1) construe the prohibition 
of torture so narrowly that many of the intended 
methods were supposedly not covered; (2) create legal 
loopholes that allowed the government to circumvent 
the prohibition of cruel, inhuman, and degrading 
treatment; and (3) immunize the persons responsible 
for the interrogations from criminal prosecution – 
from the political decision-makers to the perpetrators 
on the ground.22 
It was permitted to confine detainees 
for hours in boxes into which they 
could barely fit. 
Initially, the CIA had permission to employ 10 co-
ercive measures, euphemistically called “enhanced 
interrogation techniques,” to interrogate terrorism 
suspects.23 Although the official list of techniques re-
mains secret, it has become known that they include 
sleep deprivation over long periods of time, often 
achieved through forced standing or other painful 
“stress positions,” deafening noise, and/or bright 
lights.24 Interrogators were also permitted to expose 
prisoners to extreme heat and cold; to confine them 
for hours in boxes into which they could barely fit; 
to bang them against walls and slap them in the face 
with an open hand; to exploit their phobias, for ex-
ample fear of dogs or insects; and to employ the so-
 
22 Johannes Thimm, Farewell to the Laws Against Torture? 
The American Treatment of Detainees in the Fight Against Terrorism, 
SWP Comment 12/2005 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, March 2005); Department of Justice, Office of Pro-
fessional Responsibility, Investigation into the Office of the Legal 
Counsel’s Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intel-
ligence Agency’s Use of “Enhanced Interrogation Techniques” on Sus-
pected Terrorists, 29 July 2009; see also Goldsmith, The Terror 
Presidency (see note 9); The Torture Papers, ed. Greenberg and 
Dratel (see note 11). 
23 Morell and Harlow, The Great War of Our Time 
(see note 15), 246. 
24 See Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee 
Study (see note 20). The International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) concluded in 2007 that the interrogation tech-
niques described by prisoners, individually and collectively, 
constitute torture and/or cruel, inhuman, and degrading 
treatment. See International Committee of the Red Cross, 
ICRC Report on the Treatment of 14 “High Value Detainees” in CIA 
Custody, September 2007. 
called waterboarding,25 the use of which had to be 
approved in individual cases and has been confirmed 
with respect to three suspects.26 Through extraordi-
nary rendition, prisoners were also handed over to 
the intelligence services of allies in the war on terror, 
including numerous states that are well-known to 
torture, such as Egypt, Syria, and Uzbekistan. This 
was done both for interrogations – a practice re-
ferred to by critics as the “outsourcing of torture” – 
and to permanently remove people who were con-
sidered dangerous.27 
 
25 During waterboarding, the prisoner is tied to a board 
and his nose and mouth are covered with a cloth on which 
water is poured. When the subject tries to breathe, water 
slowly enters the lungs. In the press, waterboarding is often 
referred to as “simulated drowning”. However, the only 
aspect of it that can be called simulation is that the process 
is interrupted before the subject suffocates. Christopher 
Hitchens, “Believe Me, It’s Torture”, Vanity Fair, 2 July 2008, 
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2008/08/hitchens200808; 
Malcolm Nance, “I Know Waterboarding Is Torture – 
Because I Did It Myself”, New York Daily News, 31 October 
2007, http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/waterboarding-
torture-article-1.227670. CIA interrogation protocols show 
that Abu Zubaydah had to be reanimated after one of the 
multiple waterboarding sessions he had to endure. See 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study 
(see note 20), 423. 
26 The US government has admitted to the use of water-
boarding by the CIA with respect to three persons. Morell 
(with Harlow, The Great War of Our Time [see note 15], 246) 
claims that these were the only cases, and that the technique 
was last employed in 2003, and after 2006 it was was no 
longer authorized. Senator Dianne Feinstein casts doubts 
on Morell’s version: “Fact Check: Inaccurate and Misleading 
Assertions Related to the CIA Detention and Interrogation 
Program in The Great War of Our Time: The CIA’s Fight Against 




and-harlow-book-6-2-15.pdf. The journalist James Risen 
reports that special forces in Afghanistan also used water-
boarding. See James Risen, Pay Any Price. Greed, Power, and 
Endless War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014), 172. 
See also Human Rights Watch, Delivered into Enemy Hands. US-




27 Grey, Ghost Plane (see note 21); Open Society Justice 
Initiative, Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extra-
ordinary Rendition (New York, NY: Open Society Foundations, 
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Aggressive methods were also approved for the 
interrogation of prisoners detained at the Guantá-
namo military base. The task force responsible for 
Guantánamo asked US Central Command for the 
authorization to use aggressive interrogation tech-
niques, following training of its personnel by the 
same SERE officers who had already advised the 
CIA (see box). Although the military lawyers of all 
branches of the armed forces expressed legal and 
political concerns about aggressive interrogation 
techniques, the Pentagon’s leading legal adviser, 
William Haynes, recommended that a number of 
 
February 2013), http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/ 
reports/globalizing-torture-cia-secret-detention-and-
extraordinary-rendition. 
such practices be approved. On December 2, 2002, 
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld approved by memo a list 
of 15 of 18 requested interrogation techniques that 
went beyond the non-coercive standard techniques 
permitted in the relevant Army Field Manual.28 
Methods that were originally only approved for 
Guantánamo quickly found their way into the mili-
tary prisons in Afghanistan and Iraq. There was 
confusion as to what exactly was permitted where. 
For example, in Iraq, the Third Geneva Convention 
relative to the treatment of prisoners of war applied, 
granting captives there full prisoner-of-war status 
with all the corresponding protections. Yet, members 
of the CIA and military intelligence nevertheless used 
brutal interrogation methods. As a consequence, 
lower ranked military troops, such as prison guards, 
also mistreated prisoners there. This happened both 
when they were following instructions from the intel-
ligence personnel in connection with interrogations 
and when following their own initiative. A direct 
result of this development were the abuses in the 
Iraqi prison Abu Ghraib, graphic pictures of which 
were leaked and made headlines worldwide.29 
Cruel conditions of detention, ill-treatment, and 
torture were probably the cause of death among 
about 100 prisoners who died in US custody between 
2001 and 2006. The human rights organization 
Human Rights First concludes that 34 cases are sus-
pected or confirmed homicides; it is likely that 
another 11 prisoners died in prison as a result of 
“physical abuses or the harsh conditions of their 
detention.”30 In eight to twelve cases, the organiza-
 
28 “Action Memo for Secretary of Defense from William 
J. Haynes II, General Council, Re: Counter Resistance Tech-
niques”, 27 November 2002 (approved on 2 December 2002), 
in The Torture Papers, ed. Greenberg and Dratel (see note 11), 
236ff.; see also United States Senate, Inquiry into the Treatment 
of Detainees in U.S. Custody. Report of the Committee on Armed Ser-
vices, 20 November 2008, https://www.armed-services.senate. 
gov/imo/media/doc/Detainee-Report-Final_April-22-2009.pdf. 
29 Ibid. See in particular Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th 
Military Police Brigade (Tabuga Report), March 2004; Final Report 
of the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations (Schle-
singer Report), August 2004; Investigation of Intelligence Activities 
at Abu Ghraib/Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Prison and 205th 
Military Intelligence Brigade, LTG Anthony R. Jones/Investigation 
of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th Military Intelligence 
Brigade, MG George R. Fay (Fay-Jones Report), August 2004. 
30 Hina Shamsi, Command’s Responsibility. Detainee Deaths 
in U.S. Custody in Iraq and Afghanistan, ed. Deborah Pearlstein 
(Human Rights First Report, February 2006), http://www. 
The origins of the “enhanced 
interrogation techniques” 
The aggressive techniques were adopted from a training 
program designed to prepare US soldiers for their capture 
by enemy forces – the so-called Survival, Evasion, Resist-
ance and Escape (SERE) training. In this training, certain 
soldiers are exposed to treatment they might face if cap-
tured by enemy troops in order to increase their ability to 
resist coercion. These methods, which outside of a train-
ing situation are generally considered to violate humanitar-
ian law (they are based on practices used by the Chinese 
on US soldiers to coerce false confessions during the 
Korean War), were adopted as a model for US interroga-
tions of alleged terrorists. At the center of the techniques’ 
development were two psychologists who had been SERE 
trainers for the Air Force: James Mitchell and Bruce 
Jessen. They convinced those in government that these 
techniques could, on the one hand, make prisoners tell 
the truth and, on the other hand, that they did not con-
stitute torture.a In 2002/2003, SERE staff trained the 
Afghan, Iraqi, and Guantánamo commandos as well as 
CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency staff in the use of 
aggressive interrogation techniques.b After some time as 
government employees, Mitchell and Jessen continued to 
consult the military and intelligence agencies as private 
contractors. Over the years, the fees for their consultancy 
work accumulated to almost $70 million. 
 
a OLC Head Steven Bradbury argued to CIA Counsel 
John Rizzo that the SERE methods were safe and did not 
cause mental harm. James Risen, Pay Any Price. Greed, 
Power, and Endless War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Har-
court, 2014), 187. 
b Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee 
Study (see note 20). 
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tion assumes that prisoners were tortured to death. 
Five deaths involved the CIA.31 In 2005, the military 
admitted investigating 26 cases of criminal homicide 
in Afghanistan and Iraq.32 
In 2006, President Bush publicly defended CIA 
actions against Al-Qaeda member Abu Zubaydah, one 
of the first prisoners to be tortured in a secret prison. 
Bush claimed that the “alternative methods” were 
necessary to save lives and insistently defended their 
legality.33 
Opposition from civil society and the 
other government branches 
As more information about the secret prisons and 
detention conditions became public, criticisms grew. 




31 Ibid., 9. 
32 Douglas Jehl and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Military Says 26 
Inmate Deaths May Be Homicide”, New York Times, 16 March 
2005, https://nyti.ms/2FUeOKE. “The Torture Database”, main-
tained by the American Civil Liberties Union, contains hun-
dreds of report about criminal investigations inside the US 
military. See http://www.thetorturedatabase.org. 
33 The White House, “President Discusses Creation of Mili-
tary Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists”, 6 September 
2006, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/ 
releases/2006/09/print/20060906-3.html: “We knew that 
Zubaydah had more information that could save innocent 
lives, but he stopped talking. As his questioning proceeded, 
it became clear that he had received training on how to 
resist interrogation. And so the CIA used an alternative set 
of procedures. These procedures were designed to be safe, 
to comply with our laws, our Constitution, and our treaty 
obligations. The Department of Justice reviewed the author-
ized methods extensively and determined them to be lawful. 
I cannot describe the specific methods used – I think you 
understand why – if I did, it would help the terrorists learn 
how to resist questioning, and to keep information from us 
that we need to prevent new attacks on our country. But I 
can say the procedures were tough, and they were safe, and 
lawful, and necessary.” The protocol of a CIA interrogation 
of Abu Zubaydah is available here: “Details Regarding the 
Cycle of Interrogations of Abu Zubaydah on August 6, 2002”, 
August 2002, accessible through the UC Davis Center for the 





of attention early on. Private attorneys, human rights 
lawyers, and university law clinics took on pro bono 
cases representing inmates to defend their rights and 
access to the justice system. Investigative journalists 
and non-governmental organizations raised aware-
ness; government sources repeatedly leaked infor-
mation and documents to the press – indicating the 
degree of internal controversy surrounding the policy. 
The situation of the prisoners sprung to the atten-
tion of a wider public when the press got hold of 
photos from the Iraqi prison Abu Ghraib in May 2004. 
The pictures documented in detail instances of cruel 
abuse and sexual humiliation, including pictures of a 
prisoner’s dead body. The Abu Ghraib scandal led to 
a series of internal military investigations, which in 
turn revealed that brutal methods were used system-
atically during interrogations. Shortly afterwards, the 
first legal opinions from the Justice Department’s OLC 
– in which coercive interrogation methods had been 
declared legal – also leaked.34 
Investigative reporters finally uncovered the CIA’s 
detention and interrogation program. Through state-
ments of released prisoners and the tracking of the 
flights that the CIA had used to transport prisoners 
between various secret prisons, reporters eventually 
managed to put pieces of the puzzle together.35 The 
judicial authorities of concerned countries investi-
gated36 and the United Nations and the European 
Union took action.37 Slowly, a more comprehensive 
 
34 In December 2004, the Wall Street Journal published a 
memorandum for White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales. 
Authored by John Yoo and signed by Jay Bybee, it argues, 
inter alia, that in order to rise to the level of torture, treat-
ment must cause severe pain at “a level that would ordinarily 
be associated with a sufficiently serious physical condition 
or injury such as death, organ failure, or serious impairment 
of body functions” (p. 6). Most leaked memos are compiled 
in The Torture Papers, ed. Greenberg and Dratel (see note 11). 
35 Early pointers to the CIA program were the cases of 
Canadian citizen Maher Arar and of German citizen Khaled 
El-Masri, who were freed after prolonged CIA detention 
when their innocence finally became clear. On how journal-
ists of various countries uncovered the secret CIA flights, 
see Grey, Ghost Plane (see note 21). 
36 After the CIA had abducted a Muslim religious leader 
suspected of terrorism from the streets of Milan (probably 
with the knowledge of the Italian government), the Italian 
state prosecutor investigated. His prosecution led to the con-
viction in absentia of 22 CIA agents on charges of kidnapping. 
37 See e.g. Council of Europe: Parliamentary Assembly, 
Lawfulness of Detentions by the United States in Guantánamo Bay, 
8 April 2005, Doc. 10497; UN Economic and Social Council: 
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picture of the various aspects of imprisonment and 
torture emerged. 
From 2004, the Bush administration was increas-
ingly forced to defend its practices to the other gov-
ernment branches. The US Supreme Court granted 
Guantánamo prisoners the right to challenge their 
detentions in US courts on the basis of the habeas 
corpus principle.38 It also decided that the military 
commissions authorized by President Bush in 2001 
were inadmissible in their existing form because they 
were incompatible with the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice and the Geneva Conventions.39 
The Detainee Treatment Act was 
intended to strengthen prisoners’ 
rights – but loopholes remained. 
Congress played an ambivalent role, at times re-
stricting the executive’s freedom of action and at 
other times reaffirming it. On December 30, 2005, 
the Detainee Treatment Act was passed as part of a 
supplemental defense appropriations bill in order 
to eliminate ambiguities in the legal status quo that 
allegedly had led to the mistreatment of prisoners.40 
It was sponsored by the Republican Senator John 
McCain, who had particular credibility as Chairman 
of the Armed Forces Committee and a known foreign 
policy hawk in addition to having first-hand experi-
ence with torture as a prisoner of war in the Vietnam 
War. 
The law explicitly rejects the reasoning that the 
Justice Department lawyers had relied on to justify 
brutal interrogation methods.41 It protects all prison-
ers under the effective control of the US govern-
ment – including non-US citizens detained outside 
the US – from cruel, inhuman, and degrading treat-
ment (based on the definition laid down by Washing-
ton when it ratified the UN Convention against 
 
Commission on Human Rights, Situation of the Detainees at 
Guantánamo, 15 February 2006, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/120 
(2006). 
38 Supreme Court of the United States, Rasul v. Bush, 542 
U.S. 466 (2004). 
39 Daniel Bodansky and Peter J. Spiro, “Hamdan v. Rums-
feld. 126 S.Ct.2749”, American Journal of International Law 100, 
no. 4 (2006), 888–95. 
40 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Public Law No. 109–148, 
30 December 2005. 
41 Arsalan M. Suleman, “Detainee Treatment Act of 2005”, 
Harvard Human Rights Journal 19 (2006): 257–65. 
Torture).42 In addition, the law stipulates that all 
prisoners under control of the Defense Department 
must be treated in accordance with the standards 
of the relevant Army Field Manual, which prohibits 
cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment in accord-
ance with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conven-
tions.43 However, there are loopholes in the law. The 
standards of the Army Field Manual apply only to 
prisoners of the army, not to those held by the intel-
ligence services. It is possible to change the corre-
sponding Army Field Manual. Nor does the legislation 
outlaw extraordinary renditions. The law also strength-
ens the protection of government employees against 
attempts to prosecute them under civil or criminal 
law for the abuse of prisoners – in their legal de-
fense, they can claim to have acted in the belief that 
the interrogation methods were legal. Furthermore, 
the jurisdiction of US courts to hear habeas corpus law-
suits of prisoners against their detention in Guantá-
namo is restricted.44 
Congress strengthened the powers of the adminis-
tration with respect to the detention of enemy com-
batants and their trial before military commissions. 
After the Supreme Court in 2006 declared military 
commissions based on the 2001 Bush order illegal, 
Congress created a new legal basis for commissions 
with the Military Commissions Act (MCA).45 Unlawful 
enemy combatants of foreign nationality could now 
be tried before military commissions. This category 
includes, for example, members of Al-Qaeda, the 
 
42 This was necessary because the torture memos argued 
that the prohibition of cruel, inhuman and degrading (C.I.D.) 
treatment in the Convention Against Torture only applied 
to US persons (on the term, see note 53) protected by the US 
Constitution, since in a reservation to the treaty, Washing-
ton had based its definition of C.I.D. treatment on the mean-
ing of “cruel, unusual and inhumane treatment or punish-
ment” in the US Constitution. The court explicitly rejects 
that only US persons are protected by the convention. 
43 At the time the Detainee Treatment Act passed, this was 
Army Field Manual 34-52: Intelligence Interrogation (1992). It 
was later replaced by FM 2-22.3: Human Intelligence Collector 
Operations (2006). 
44 President Bush continued to undermine the law’s intent 
to close loopholes. Upon approving the legislation, he added 
in a signing statement that the executive would construe the 
law consistent with his inherent authority as Commander-in-
Chief to protect the American people from further terrorist 
attacks. In other words: If the law hindered this objective, it 
would be unconstitutional and he could ignore it. 
45 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Public Law No. 109–
366, 17 October 2006. 
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Taliban, and forces allied with them who have par-
ticipated in, or materially supported, hostile actions. 
In addition, tribunals appointed by the Secretary 
of Defense may declare prisoners unlawful enemy 
combatants.46 New procedural rules have strengthened 
the rights of the defendants compared to the previous 
military commissions, but they are still not compa-
rable with the rule of law standards in civilian crimi-
nal proceedings or courts martial. Statements made 
under torture are inadmissible; however, coerced 
statements may be used under certain circumstances. 
Rulings of military commissions can be appealed only 
once in a federal appeals court. The law reaffirms 
that unlawful combatants cannot make habeas corpus 
claims in US courts, even if their cases are already 
pending.47 Those detained as unlawful combatants 
have no way to challenge their detention before a 
tribunal has established their status; this way, they 
can potentially be detained indefinitely. 
With the MCA, Congress came to the administra-
tion’s aid after the Supreme Court overturned the 
system of military commissions. The direct applic-
ability of the Geneva Conventions to the standards 
of detention and the definitions of torture and cruel, 
inhuman, and degrading treatment were more lim-
ited than in international law, although not as 
restricted as in the administration’s legal memoranda. 
The legislators did not follow the executive in all 
respects and guaranteed a minimum of rule of law 
standards. Nevertheless, they gave the government 
much more flexibility in dealing with enemy com-
batants than would be have been possible under a 
traditional legal process.48 
In September 2006, President Bush publicly ad-
mitted that secret prisons existed and ended the prac-
tice at the same time. The remaining 14 high-value 
detainees were transferred to Guantánamo and the 
International Committee of the Red Cross was granted 
access to them. Formally, the CIA’s detention and 
 
46 For this and for the following, see Arsalan M. Suleman, 
“Military Commissions Act of 2006”, Harvard Human Rights 
Journal 20 (2007): 325–37. 
47 In contrast, in the case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Su-
preme Court had exempted pending cases from the Detainee 
Treatment Act’s restrictions on habeas corpus challenges. 
48 See also Jack Goldsmith, “How Obama Learned to Love 




interrogation program remained in place, but most 
likely it was no longer used after 2006. 
Ending torture under Obama 
Shortly after taking office, President Obama issued 
an Executive Order mandating all government 
authorities, including the CIA, to follow the relevant 
Army Field Manual in the treatment of prisoners.49 
The administration admitted the use of torture in the 
past and ruled it out for the future. First, the desig-
nated candidate for Attorney General, Eric Holder, 
publicly admitted that the use of waterboarding con-
stitutes torture. Later, Obama also declared that pris-
oners had been tortured in US custody – a fact that 
the Bush administration had denied to the very end, 
not least because of the implications for criminal 
prosecution.50 
But Obama deliberately kept open the possibility 
of imprisoning prisoners without a trial for an un-
limited period of time. After recognizing how many 
of the Guantánamo detainees were potentially dan-
gerous but could not be tried due to lack of evidence, 
the administration successfully defended the possi-
bility of unlimited detention in the courts. Obama’s 
legal justification was not based on the president’s 
inherent power, but on the AUMF. However, in prac-
tice, nothing changed for the prisoners. Obama’s 
attempts to close Guantánamo were defeated by Con-
gress. In a series of laws, Congress prohibited the 
president from transferring prisoners from Guantá-
namo to the US. The number of inmates there was 
further reduced, but at the end of Obama’s final term 
in office, there were still 41 prisoners in Guantána-
mo. Among them were five recommended for release 
by a government body and 26 who were found to be 
 
49 Executive Order No. 12491, Ensuring Lawful Interrogations, 
Fed. Reg. 4893 (22 January 2009). 
50 David Stout, “Holder Tells Senators Waterboarding Is 
Torture”, New York Times, 15 January 2009, https://nyti.ms/ 
2F5c2kE; The White House, “Press Conference by the Presi-
dent”, 1 August 2014, https://obamawhitehouse.archives. 
gov/the-press-office/2014/08/01/press-conference-president: 
“We did a whole lot of things that were right, but we tor-
tured some folks. We did some things that were contrary 
to our values. [...] And when we engaged in some of these 
enhanced interrogation techniques, techniques that I believe 
and I think any fair-minded person would believe were 
torture, we crossed a line.” 
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too dangerous to release.51 Obama also kept open the 
option for extraordinary rendition. However, from 
what we know, it was not used to outsource torture, 
as had been alleged of the Bush administration. In the 
time since Trump has taken office, one Guantánamo 
prisoner has been transferred to Saudi Arabia to serve 
out the remainder of his sentence; he was convicted 
after pleading guilty to war crimes.52 
Indiscriminate surveillance of 
communication 
The ability of the intelligence and law enforcement 
communities to monitor electronic communications 
has continuously evolved over the years to keep 
pace with technological developments. The terrorist 
attacks on 9/11 revealed gaps in intelligence gathering 
and sharing. As a result, the technical capabilities and 
legal license to collect and store electronic data have 
been massively expanded, and the ability to exchange 
data between different authorities has been enhanced. 
Neither Obama’s time in office nor the criticisms that 
followed Snowden’s revelations about the existing 
practices fundamentally changed this trend. As a 
result, the US government now has a variety of means 
to monitor communications and internet activities 
at home and abroad and to share the insights gained 
within security and law enforcement agencies. The 
use of surveillance measures is not limited to com-
bating terrorism but includes all purposes of foreign 
intelligence, as well as some law enforcement activ-
ities, such as the war on drugs. 
Overview of the legal basis of the 
surveillance regime 
The debate in the US focuses primarily on the han-
dling of data of US persons,53 who are protected from 
 
51 Carol Rosenberg, “Guantánamo. By the Numbers”, 
Miami Herald, 25 October 2016 (last modified 16 July 2018), 
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/ 
americas/guantanamo/article2163210.html. 
52 Carol Rosenberg, “U.S. Releases Guantánamo Convict 
to Saudi Arabia in First Transfer of Trump Era”, Miami Herald, 
2 May 2018, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-
world/world/americas/guantanamo/article208718319.html. 
53 The legal term “US person” refers to US citizens regard-
less of their location as well as permanent legal residents in 
unreasonable searches and seizures by the Fourth 
Amendment of the Constitution, which also applies 
to intrusions on their communication. The current 
practice is under criticism because even the statutory 
rights of US persons are not sufficiently safeguarded 
(non-US persons lack corresponding rights under US 
law). We can distinguish between three legal regimes, 
which are used as the basis for monitoring. The first, 
Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act, adopted in 2001, 
relates mainly to domestic intelligence. On this basis, 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the 
National Security Agency (NSA) temporarily operated 
programs to routinely collect and store – in coopera-
tion with the major telephone and internet providers 
– the metadata of all electronic communications 
for five years. When these programs became known 
publicly, they were widely criticized for being dis-
proportionate. The collection of e-mail metadata was 
discontinued in 2011. Three different institutions 
concluded unanimously that the program was inef-
fective and based on a problematic interpretation of 
Section 215. The three groups were: the President’s 
Review Group on Intelligence and Communications 
Technologies, an expert commission set up by Obama 
in response to the Snowden revelations; the Privacy 
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), a biparti-
san advisory council on privacy and civil rights estab-
lished by Congress in 2004; and finally the Inspector 
General of the Department of Justice. Subsequently, 
the handling of telephone connection data was also 
modified, and Congress passed the USA Freedom Act 
(see below). 
The more important surveillance programs fall 
under the category of foreign intelligence. The sec-
ond legal basis is codified in Section 702 of the FISA 
Amendments Act (FAA), a modified version, adopted 
in 2008, of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA) of 1978. Third, the president claims inherent 
authorities based on the Constitution that are de-
scribed in Executive Order 12333. 
FISA is the result of efforts by Congress at that time 
to better control the activities of the intelligence ser-
vices. It defined rules for foreign intelligence gather-
ing on US territory. Accordingly, persons in the US 
suspected of foreign espionage could only be moni-
tored based on a warrant by the then newly estab-
lished Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC, 
or the FISA Court). All forms of electronic intelligence 
 
the United States. US persons are under US jurisdiction and 
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not covered by FISA – in particular the surveillance 
of non-US citizens outside the US – were carried out 
on the basis of Executive Order 12333.54 Such foreign 
intelligence was the responsibility of the NSA, which 
specializes in signals intelligence and is part of the 
Defense Department. 
The evolution of surveillance since 9/11 
After 9/11, the Bush administration relaxed the pro-
visions for the work of the NSA to allow it to operate 
domestically. But instead of seeking a change in the 
law, Bush authorized the NSA on October 4, 2001, 
based on his authority as president, to circumvent the 
rules of FISA.55 As a result, the NSA, in cooperation 
with the major telephone companies, began to moni-
tor telephone calls and e-mails in which either the 
sender or the recipient of the communication were 
located abroad. The content of communications sus-
pected of being related to Al-Qaeda was scrutinized. 
In addition, the metadata of millions of telephone 
calls and e-mails were collected and stored in bulk 
and without specific cause. During the initial years, 
this generated controversies within the administra-
tion about the legality of the measures, and the legal 
justifications changed several times.56 
In December 2005, the New York Times uncovered 
a program of the NSA to intercept calls on American 
territory without judicial authorization and in vio-
lation of FISA.57 As a result, the Bush administration 
 
54 Daniel Severson, “American Surveillance of Non-U.S. 
Persons: Why New Privacy Protections Offer Only Cosmetic 
Change”, Harvard International Law Journal 56, no. 2 (2015): 
465–514 (468–69). 
55 The Bush administration viewed the FISA Court as an 
unconstitutional limit on the president’s power. The partici-
pants of the War Council played prominent roles in this 
decision. David Addington wrote the authorization, whereas 
John Yoo authored a legal memorandum confirming the 
legality of the order. See Savage, Power Wars (see note 18), 
183ff. 
56 When Jack Goldsmith took over as head of the OLC, he 
reversed Yoo’s legal opinions and temporarily halted some 
activities. However, he came up with new justifications for 
the measures and managed to convince the FISA Court of 
their legality. For more details, see Savage, Power Wars (see 
note 18), 192–95. 
57 Internally, the measure was initially called “President’s 
Surveillance Program”; from 2005 onward, the press referred 
to it as “Warrantless-Wiretapping Program”. When the ad-
abandoned the secrecy of this measure.58 The other 
programs for storing telephone and e-mail metadata 
initially remained secret, although the newspaper 
USA Today reported on the monitoring of telephone 
metadata in May 2006.59 
The Bush administration simply 
regarded all data as “relevant” to 
prevent terrorist attacks. 
At the insistence of the Bush administration, on 
May 26, 2006, the FISA Court began – initially with-
out public knowledge – to approve the collection 
of telephone metadata in bulk for certain periods in-
stead of issuing specific judicial decisions for indi-
vidual surveillance measures. According to FISA, the 
Court may order the collection of information rele-
vant to espionage or terrorism investigations. The 
administration convinced the judges that all the data 
was relevant to prevent terrorist attacks.60 Based on 
the FISA Court’s approval, the government was able 
to refute the allegation of an outright violation of the 
law. The Court’s interpretation of the law, however, 
remained highly controversial after its publication. 
At the time, the decision was taken in secret, without 
public knowledge or debate. 
In response to the New York Times revelation of the 
surveillance of telephone conversations, the FISA 
Amendments Act was passed in 2008, legalizing key 
aspects of existing practices.61 Under Section 702, 
 
ministration declassified the program, it called it “Terrorist 
Surveillance Program”. 
58 The reporters James Risen and Eric Lichtblau had had 
the relevant information since October 2004, but under 
pressure from the government, the New York Times held back 
the story. See Risen, Pay Any Price (see note 26), 270. 
59 Lesley Cauley, “NSA Has Massive Database of Americans’ 
Phone Calls”, USA Today, 11 May 2006, 
https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-05-
10-nsa_x.htm. 
60 A further argument was a reference to the Patriot Act, 
which mandated that the collection and “business records” 
did not require a court order. Since telecommunications 
companies routinely collected and stored metadata, they 
were considered business records. To justify the e-mail meta-
data collection, reference was made to the possibility under 
the original FISA to use “pen-register/trap-and-trace” tech-
niques to collect telephone metadata. This justification was 
then transferred to internet communications. 
61 The FAA replaced the temporary Protect America Act 
of 2007. It also granted immunity from civil or criminal 
charges to the telecommunications companies involved. 
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the Attorney General, together with the Director of 
National Intelligence (DNI), may authorize communi-
cation surveillance directed against non-US citizens 
abroad. Interception may take place on US territory as 
long as at least one of the communicating persons is 
a non-US person abroad. In contrast to the original 
FISA, it is not necessary to establish a proper cause or 
to obtain a warrant for individual surveillance meas-
ures. Moreover, unlike the previous Terrorist Surveil-
lance Program, it is not a requirement that surveil-
lance targets have a link to terrorism; rather, any 
purpose of foreign intelligence is permitted. Inci-
dental collection of data from US persons is legal, 
as this is not the original objective of the monitoring 
measure. The use of the data thus collected is not 
limited to national security investigations. The FBI 
received extensive powers to use the data for law 
enforcement.62 
Two of the NSA’s most important programs – Up-
stream and Prism – are conducted under Section 702 
of the FAA. Under Upstream, the NSA taps into the 
internet infrastructure – the so-called backbone of 
the internet – and searches all traffic according to 
certain criteria. Data filtered out in this way is stored 
on its own servers. With Prism, providers of internet 
services, such as social media or cloud services, are 
obliged to transmit the data of certain users to the US 
authorities. Both programs are not limited to meta-
data and can also access content. In the years between 
the adoption of the FAA in 2008 and the Snowden 
leaks in 2013, the rules in Section 702 on how infor-
mation collected can be searched, processed, and 
shared became less and less restrictive. Obama’s as-
sumption of office did nothing to change this con-
tinuous expansion of surveillance powers.63 
Upstream and Prism also collect large amounts of 
data from US citizens incidentally. In principle, the 
FISA Court authorizes the activities under Section 702 
on condition that the sensitive data of US persons is 
made unrecognizable before it is processed further; 
however, the information does not have to be deleted. 
Each agency has its own minimization procedures, 
according to which sensitive data is handled.64 The 
 
62 Jennifer Granick, Reigning in Warrantless Wiretapping of 
Americans New York (New York, NY: The Century Foundation, 
16 March 2017), 16. 
63 See Savage, Power Wars (see note 18), 560f. 
64 See Jadzia Butler and Jennifer S. Granick, “Correcting 
the Record on 702: A Prerequisite for Meaningful Surveil-
lance Reform”, Just Security (15 September 2016): 10, https:// 
www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Butler-
minimization procedures contain rules limiting the 
retention, dissemination, and use of the information. 
In consultation with the FISA Court, the details of the 
rules were repeatedly changed. One important rule 
concerns the question of what criteria each agency 
has to apply in using selectors, that is, the search 
terms that determine legitimate surveillance targets 
the scope of the information searched. The FBI, for 
example, as a domestic agency, has broader authority 
to use the data of US citizens than institutions dealing 
with foreign intelligence. It can search the data col-
lected under Section 702, including information 
about US citizens, and even has full access to the raw 
data collected under Prism. Since this procedure 
circumvents the need for a court order, it is referred 
to as a backdoor search.65 While the FISA Court ap-
proves the various minimization procedures, only the 
executive checks the compliance with these rules. The 
FISA Court has repeatedly complained in the past that 
the intelligence services did not observe the rules for 
the protection of US persons.66 But despite repeated 
disregard of the guidelines, the Court has continued 
to reauthorize the program. 
A changed debate after the Snowden 
revelations 
In the years immediately following the adoption of 
the FAA, which fell in Obama’s first term, the execu-
tive – with the approval of the FISA Court – further 
relaxed the restrictions on the handling of data.67 
Only the leaking of information about the classified 
programs by Edward Snowden reversed this trend. 
The leaks sparked a broad public debate and had the 
effect of making the procedures somewhat more re-
 
Granick-Correcting-the-Record-Scope-of-702.pdf; see also 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Release of 
2015 Section 702 Minimization Procedures”, IC on the Record 
(11 August 2016), https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/ 
148797010498/release-of-2015-section-702-minimization. 
65 Granick, Reigning in Warrantless Wiretapping (see note 62), 16. 
66 See e.g. Tim Johnson, “Secret Court Rebukes NSA for 
5-year Illegal Surveillance of U.S. Citizens”, McClatchy DC 
Bureau, 26 May 2017, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/ 
nation-world/national/national-security/article152947909. 
html; United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 
“Memorandum Opinion and Order”, 6 November 2015 
(classified), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/20151106-
702Mem_Opinion_Order_for_Public_Release.pdf. 
67 See e.g. Savage, Power Wars (see note 18), 555–58. 
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strictive again. In response to the controversy, Obama 
appointed a panel of five experts to review the sur-
veillance regime – the President’s Review Group on 
Intelligence and Communications Technologies. It 
published a report with numerous policy recommen-
dations, some of which were taken up. The revela-
tions also influenced two reports from the Privacy 
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (one on the tele-
phone metadata program under Section 215 of the 
Patriot Act, and one on surveillance under Section 
702 of the FAA). The PCLOB was critical of the pro-
gram under Section 215, but it confirmed that the 
program under Section 702 helped to identify ter-
rorists and thwart planned attacks. The board never-
theless made a number of proposals to improve com-
pliance and increase transparency. It recommended 
making FISA Court decisions, minimization proce-
dures, and statistics on data collection public. For the 
most part, the suggestions were taken up.68 Since the 
PCLOB’s mandate relates to the anti-terrorist aspects 
of the programs, it only touched marginally on the 
impact of Section 702 on law enforcement. 
With the 2014 Presidential Policy 
Directive, Obama recognized for the 
first time that foreign citizens also 
have a right to privacy. 
Two policy changes would have been inconceivable 
without the Snowden revelations. On January 17, 2014, 
President Obama issued Presidential Policy Directive 
28 (PPD-28), which establishes further guidelines on 
espionage and the surveillance of foreign targets. The 
directive refers to measures taken under Executive 
Order 12333, that is, in accordance with the inherent 
authority of the executive for foreign intelligence. 
Although PPD-28 largely codified existing practice, it 
was recognized for the first time that foreign citizens 
also have a right to privacy, which can only be in-
fringed upon in special circumstances. Similar to US 
citizens, minimization rules are introduced to help 
protect the privacy of innocent people. In addition, 
espionage is limited to six purposes. It is authorized 
to detect: foreign espionage; terrorist threats; prolif-
eration of weapons of mass destruction; threats to 
cyber security; threats to the US and its allies; and 
 
68 Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, “Recommen-
dations Assessment Report”, 5 February 2016, https://www. 
pclob.gov/library/Recommendations_Assessment_Report_ 
20160205.pdf. 
threats from transnational crime.69 Economic motives 
are excluded, unless national security issues are con-
cerned, such as the monitoring of sanctions regimes. 
However, as this is a purely executive measure, it is 
not certain that this policy will be maintained under 
President Trump. 
The Freedom Act brought perhaps the most signifi-
cant restrictions on surveillance to date. The law that 
was passed in June 2015 reformed the telephone 
metadata program. The data is no longer transferred 
to and stored on government servers; instead, the 
data remains with the telephone companies and is 
kept for 180 days. Data is only transferred to the 
security authorities on the basis of a FISA Court war-
rant. Such warrants, unlike before, must be based on 
a specific and sufficiently narrow selection criterion 
to avoid collection in bulk.70 When the FISA Court 
decides on surveillance measures, a “Special Advo-
cate” representing the privacy interests of citizens is 
heard in addition to the agency making the request. 
In addition, the requirements for the publication of 
FISA Court rulings are being expanded. The reform 
was only possible because the existing legislation had 
a sunset clause leading to its expiration on June 1, 
2015. Without new legislation, there would have 
been no legal basis to continue the surveillance pro-
gram; therefore, critics in Congress of the existing 
practices were able to use their power to block the 
reauthorization to force reforms. 
However, in January 2018, Section 702 of the FAA, 
which also contained a sunset clause and had to be 
renewed, was reauthorized without any significant 
changes, although the statute has been subject to on-
going criticisms since the Snowden revelations. The 
section allows the FBI to search the data of US persons 
collected “incidentally” in the surveillance of foreign 
intelligence targets in a virtually unrestricted manner 
and to pass it on to local police departments. These 
far-reaching implications did not prevent a bipartisan 
 
69 The White House, “Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-28, 
Subject: Signals Intelligence Activities”, 17 January 2014. See 
also Benjamin Wittes, “The President’s Speech and PPD-28: 
A Guide for the Perplexed”, Lawfare, 20 January 2014, https:// 
www.lawfareblog.com/presidents-speech-and-ppd-28-guide-
perplexed; Savage, Power Wars (see note 18), 605. 
70 See e.g. Florian Gawehns and Johannes Thimm, Ein biss-
chen Freiheit. Was die Verabschiedung des Freedom Act durch den 
US-Kongress bedeutet, SWP-Aktuell 56/2015 (Berlin: Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, June 2015). 
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majority in Congress from extending the law in its 
existing form for another six years.71 
In conclusion, with respect to surveillance, the 
overall patterns are the same as with the detention 
and interrogation program: The Bush administration, 
at first, tried to circumvent the law in secret. After 
some of the clandestine surveillance activities became 
public knowledge, a legal basis was created for them. 
Essentially, the existing practice was legalized with-
out major restrictions. Although the Obama adminis-
tration put the existing programs on a more solid and 
formal legal basis, it initially expanded the govern-
ment’s powers. Only when the extent of the surveil-
lance became public through the Snowden leaks were 
there some course corrections. The bottom line, how-
ever, is that the possibilities available to government 
agencies – in collecting and storing communications 
data as well as use by different agencies – go far 
beyond what was allowed before 9/11. 
Targeted killing 
The clearest evidence that the term “war on terror-
ism” is not a metaphor is the policy of targeted 
killings. The use of lethal force in the fight against 
terrorism is not limited to areas or time periods in 
which the US is obviously involved in hostilities. In 
addition to the well-known theaters of war in Afgha-
nistan, Iraq, and Syria, where the US is engaged in 
ongoing military operations on the basis of inter-
national law for armed conflict (which, under certain 
circumstances, permits lethal force against enemy 
combatants), targeted killings have taken place in 
Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen since 9/11. The 
legal justification for them has also been the 2001 
authorization of military force. 
The lethal use of drones stands 
paradigmatically for the normali-
zation of extraordinary methods. 
To eliminate suspected terrorists, both special 
forces as well as air strikes from manned and un-
manned aircraft are employed. Both the military and 
the CIA use drones, as unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAVs) are commonly known. The number of drone 
 
71 Charlie Savage, “Congress Approves Six-Year Extension 
of Surveillance Law”, New York Times, 18 January 2018, 
https://nyti.ms/2DjAcYl. 
missions over the past 17 years shows no clear trends. 
They vary from country to country and within coun-
tries over time.72 One thing is clear: The increasing 
number of armed drones available was initially 
accompanied by a dramatic increase in air strikes, 
with a temporary peak in 2010. 
The lethal use of drones stands paradigmatically 
for the normalization of extraordinary methods in 
the war on terror. Initially, the CIA conducted drone 
operations under strict secrecy as covert operations. 
The US government long maintained its policy of not 
officially acknowledging such operations, even 
though they had long been an open secret, reported 
by the media, and sometimes confirmed anonymously 
by government officials.73 By refusing to acknowledge 
the attacks, the government avoided taking respon-
sibility for mistakes and the killing of innocent 
people. More recently, the government has officially 
admitted to the use of drones for targeted killings. In 
2010, it began to acknowledge the policy in general, 
and since 2016, it has also provided official informa-
tion on individual strikes.74 This did not result in any 
significant public criticism to such operations. 
Most recently, President Trump announced that he 
would relax the guidelines for drone strikes. Regard-
ing the government’s assessment of the fundamental 
legitimacy and necessity of targeted killings, the con-
tinuity between the various incumbents prevails. The 
 
72 Three organizations attempting to systematically keep 
track of armed drone attacks by the US are the Federation 
for the Defense of Democracies, which runs the Long War 
Journal, https://www.longwarjournal.org/us-airstrikes-in-the-
long-war; the New America Foundation, http://securitydata. 
newamerica.net/; and the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2017-01-01/ 
drone-wars-the-full-data. For an overview, see Micah Zenko, 
Questioning Obama’s Drone Deaths Data (New York, NY, and 
Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, 1 July 
2016), https://www.cfr.org/blog/questioning-obamas-drone-
deaths-data. In 2016, the Obama administration first pub-
lished official numbers about drone attacks and their vic-
tims; however, independent experts consider these numbers 
as too low: Director of National Intelligence, Summary of In-
formation Regarding U.S. Counterterrorism Strikes outside Areas 
of Active Hostilities (June 2016), https://www.dni.gov/files/ 
documents/Newsroom/Press%20Releases/DNI+Release+on+ 
CT+Strikes+Outside+Areas+of+Active+Hostilities.PDF. 
73 See Cora Currier, “How the Gov’t Talks about a Drone 
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legal and administrative basis for targeted killings has 
been repeatedly modified. But beyond questions of 
style, decisions on targeted killings seem to have been 
shaped above all by tactical considerations and tech-
nical possibilities, regardless of who is in charge. 
Origins and evolution of the 
practice of targeted killing 
Already under President Bill Clinton, the elimination 
of terrorists – and the immediate threat they posed 
to the United States – was considered self-defense 
and did not fall under the prohibition of political 
assassinations that had been in force since Gerald 
Ford’s time in office.75 According to Richard Clark – 
at the time the White House’s anti-terrorism czar – 
Clinton used the instrument very rarely.76 Potential 
targets for killing had to undergo a strict review pro-
cess within the CIA as well as the executive branch, 
and each operation had to be personally approved by 
the president. After 9/11, George W. Bush delegated 
the authority to hunt down and kill alleged terrorists 
to the head of the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center. Tar-
geted killings have become a central part of the battle 
against Al-Qaeda.77 In 2004, Defense Secretary Rums-
feld also authorized the military’s special forces to 
 
75 When investigations by Congress in the 1970s uncovered 
numerous assassination attempts by the CIA – including on 
foreign heads of government – President Ford issued Execu-
tive Order (E.O.) 11905 on 19 February 1976. Section 5(g) 
bans political assassinations. Subsequent administrations 
continued the prohibition, even as they repeatedly violated 
it in specific cases. E.O. 12036 Sec. 2-305 from 26 January 
1978 (issued under President Jimmy Carter) outlawed “assas-
sinations” in general. In E.O. 12333, Sec. 2.11, from 4 De-
cember 1981, President Ronald Reagan confirmed this 
policy, which is still valid with only slight modifications to 
this day. See Elizabeth B. Bazan, Assassination Ban and E.O. 
12333: A Brief Summary, CRS Report for Congress RS 21037 
(Washington, D.C.: CRS, 4 January 2002), https://fas.org/irp/ 
crs/RS21037.pdf. 
76 Scahill, Dirty Wars (see note 15), 5f. 
77 One anonymous official put it this way: “Lethal Opera-
tions that were unthinkable pre-September 11 are now 
underway.” See Bob Woodward, “CIA Told to Do ‘Whatever 
Necessary’ to Kill Bin Laden”, Washington Post, 21 October 
2001, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2007/11/18/AR2007111800655pf.html.. 
carry out clandestine operations, including targeted 
killings.78 
Technological progress led to a growing reliance on 
unmanned aerial vehicles.79 UAVs allow for the sur-
veillance of potential targets from the air. This helped 
to compensate for the lack of human intelligence on 
Al-Qaeda. Drones are equipped with laser-guided mis-
siles, allowing them to carry out relatively precise air 
strikes. They are controlled remotely from military 
bases within the US, so there is no risk of US troop 
losses.80 They also made it possible to carry out opera-
tions on short notice in territories without any US 
personnel on the ground. As more and more drones 
became available, the number of such attacks rose 
sharply. It remains controversial as to whether the 
increasing difficulty in arresting and detaining terror 
suspects without due process – because of public 
criticism and resistance from Congress and the 
courts – also contributed to the rising number of 
drone strikes.81 
In armed conflicts that – based on international 
humanitarian law – allow for the use of deadly force 
against the enemy, armed drones are just another in-
 
78 According to the journalist Mark Mazzetti, Rumsfeld 
issued a secret order, authorizing the Joint Special Opera-
tions Command to carry out secret operations of espionage, 
capture, and killing in more than 12 countries, form North 
Africa to the Philippines. See Mark Mazzetti, The Way of the 
Knife. The CIA, a Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth 
(New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2013), 128. 
79 See Micah Zenko, Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies, 
Council Special Report no. 65 (New York, NY, and Washing-
ton, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, January 2013). 
80 The use of Predator drones was first tested shortly before 
9/11. The first air strike with a drone took place on 4 Febru-
ary 2002 in Afghanistan, the first use outside a conflict zone 
on 4 November 2002 in Yemen. See John Sifton, “A Brief 
History of Drones”, The Nation, 7 February 2012, https:// 
www.thenation.com/article/brief-history-drones. 
81 President Obama declared in 2013: “America does not 
take strikes when we have the ability to capture individual 
terrorists; our preference is always to detain, interrogate, 
and prosecute.” The White House, “Remarks by the President 
at the National Defense University”, 23 May 2013, https:// 
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/ 
remarks-president-national-defense-university. Mark Maz-
zetti, however, writes (Mazzetti, The Way of the Knife [see note 
78], 126) that internal deliberations within the CIA tilted 
more towards kill missions with every setback of the deten-
tion and interrogation program. 
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strument of warfare.82 This has been the case with the 
military intervention in Afghanistan.83 But as with 
targeted killings in general, drone attacks are not lim-
ited to areas of active hostilities. The Bush administra-
tion interpreted the authorization of military force 
passed by Congress to mandate the hunt of Al-Qaeda 
members and their allies everywhere. 
The number of drone strikes reached 
a temporary peak in 2010. 
Drone strikes frequently took place in Pakistan, 
whose border region with Afghanistan serves as a 
retreat for fighters of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. 
Yemen, used by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP) as a base of operations because of its weak 
government, was also a frequent target. According to 
Long War Journal data, the number of annual drone 
attacks in Pakistan was in the single digits up to and 
including 2007, before rising to 35 in 2008, the last 
year of Bush’s second term.84 This trajectory con-
tinued under Obama until the number of strikes 
reached its peak in 2010, with 117 attacks. Since 
then, the number has declined steadily, mainly due 
to Al-Qaeda’s weakened position in Pakistan; in 2016 
and 2017 it was back in the single digits.85 However, 
President Trump has declared that he will renew the 
focus of the war on terror on Pakistan. In Yemen, 
drone attacks numbered in the double digits for the 
first time in 2011; since 2012 there have been be-
tween 20 and 40 of them per year. According to the 
Long War Journal, more than 100 air strikes took place 
 
82 For an assessment of the international law implications, 
see Peter Rudolf and Christian Schaller, “Targeted Killing”. Zur 
völkerrechtlichen, ethischen und strategischen Problematik gezielten 
Tötens in der Terrorismus- und Aufstandsbekämpfung, SWP-Studie 
1/2012 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, January 
2012). 
83 Yet, there is evidence that special forces systematically 
violated the laws of war in their pursuit of terrorists in Af-
ghanistan. See Matthew Cole, “The Crimes of Seal Team 6”, 
The Intercept, 10 January 2017; Scahill, Dirty Wars (see note 15). 
84 “US Airstrikes in the Long War”, FDD’s Long War Journal, 
no date, https://www.longwarjournal.org/us-airstrikes-in-the-
long-war. 
85 Greg Miller, “Why CIA Drone Strikes Have Plummeted”, 
Washington Post, 16 June 2016, http://wapo.st/23e4a6O. Obama’s 
decision to transfer the responsibility for drone operations 
from the CIA to the armed forces contributed to the drop. 
Another possible reason is the shift in focus to fighting the 
Islamic State after 2014. 
in Yemen in 2017.86 For a long time, the US leader-
ship did not officially acknowledge the drone pro-
gram, not least because the operations were quietly 
condoned by the governments of Yemen and Pakis-
tan. Therefore, Washington did not have to publicly 
defend its policy or take responsibility for civilian 
victims.87 In addition to the air strikes, targeted kil-
lings by special forces continued; the best-known case 
is the elimination of Osama Bin Laden in his hiding 
place in Abbottabad, Pakistan.88 This occasion also 
showed that the US government was willing to selec-
tively acknowledge killing missions when it suited its 
political interests. 
Greater transparency and more killings 
Under Obama, the number of drone strikes initially 
continued to increase.89 He also continued the con-
troversial practice of signature strikes, in which tar-
gets are selected on the basis of patterns of suspicious 
behavior without actually knowing the identity of 
the targeted persons.90 At the same time, the Obama 
 
86 See “US Airstrikes in the Long War” (see note 84). 
87 Estimates of civilian victims differ widely. According to 
US government figures, between 64 and 116 non-combatants 
were killed “outside of areas of active hostilities” between 
early 2009 and the end of 2015 (before that no official fig-
ures are available). The three non-governmental organiza-
tions keeping track of drone strikes put the number for the 
same time period between 184 and 570 killed civilians. See 
Zenko, Questioning Obama’s Drone Deaths Data (see note 72). For 
the time period since 2001, the three organizations estimate 
on average 474 killed civilians. Examples of civilians killed 
by mistake can be found, for example, in Open Society Jus-
tice Initiative, “Death by Drone. Civilian Harm Caused by 
U.S. Targeted Killings in Yemen”, Open Society Foundations, 
April 2015, https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/ 
death-drone. 
88 Depending on the area of operation, missions take place 
with or without the consent of the host government. The con-
cept of safe harbors is central to the legal analysis. On the 
evolution of the legal literature on this type of intrusion on 
state sovereignty, see Theresa Reinold, “State Weakness, Irregu-
lar Warfare, and the Right to Self-Defense Post-9/11”, Ameri-
can Journal of International Law 105, no. 2 (2011): 244–86. 
89 On this point and the following, see Peter Rudolf, Präsi-
dent Obamas Drohnenkrieg, SWP-Aktuell 37/2013 (Berlin: Stif-
tung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 2013). 
90 See also Micah Zenko, Targeted Killings and Signature 
Strikes (New York, NY, and Washington, D.C.: Council on 
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administration gradually took steps to make its policy 
of targeted killings more transparent and to provide 
a more precise legal justification for the policy. In 
March 2010, State Department legal adviser Harold 
Koh publicly laid out the government’s view for the 
first time that the practice of targeted killings by 
drones was in line with the law.91 In the following 
years, members of the administration continued to 
go on record to elaborate on the legal framework.92 
As their statements showed, from a US government 
perspective, there were not just the traditional cat-
egories of combatants – members of an enemy force 
and individuals actively involved in hostilities – who 
could legally be targeted with lethal force. Relying on 
the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN 
Charter, the US claimed the right to also kill persons 
that constitute a “continuing, imminent threat.” In 
contrast to the plain meaning of the word “immi-
nent,” the term is interpreted broadly and does not 
require any evidence that a specific attack is under-
way.93 Such persons may also be targeted outside 
areas of active hostilities. It is this category that is 
particularly controversial because, in doing so, the 
US government is claiming the right to kill terror 
suspects wherever it determines that the host govern-
ment itself is unwilling or unable to act against 
alleged terrorists.94 
 
Foreign Relations, 16 July 2012), https://www.cfr.org/blog/ 
targeted-killings-and-signature-strikes. 
91 For a critical analysis of this legal position, see Christian 
Schaller, “Using Force Against Terrorists ‘Outside Areas of 
Active Hostilities’. The Obama Approach and the Bin Laden 
Raid Revisited”, Journal of Conflict & Security Law 20, no. 2 
(2015): 195–227. 
92 See Schmitt, “U.S. Commando Killed in Yemen” (see 
note 3); The White House, “Report on the Legal and Policy 
Frameworks Guiding the United States’ Use of Military Force 
and Related National Security Operations”, December 2016, 
44–48 (Appendix), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ 
sites/whitehouse.gov/files/documents/Legal_Policy_Report.pdf. 
93 White House, “Report on the Legal and Policy Frame-
works” (see note 92), 9; Rudolf, Präsident Obamas Drohnenkrieg 
(see note 89), 3. 
94 White House, “Report on the Legal and Policy Frame-
works” (see note 92), 10. On page 20, the report further con-
tains the tautological statement: “using targeted lethal force 
against an enemy consistent with the law of armed conflict 
does not constitute an ‘assassination.’ Assassinations are un-
lawful killings and are prohibited by Executive Order.” For a 
critical assessment, see Elliot Ackerman, “Assassination and 
the American Language”, New Yorker, 20 November 2014, 
In 2013, Obama restricted the conditions for such 
operations in presidential policy guidance. In addi-
tion to their being an immediate threat, capturing the 
target must be considered impossible; there must be 
“near certainty” that no civilians will be injured or 
killed; and the host government should prove to be 
not able or willing to take effective action against the 
threat. At the same time, Obama reduced the CIA’s 
role in conducting drone strikes and transferred 
the responsibility to the military.95 The details of the 
legal justifications and the decision-making processes 
to authorize targeted killings kept changing.96 Since 
2013, Obama has changed the status of certain regions 
in Libya several times. At times he declared them 
areas of active combat (and thus relaxed the standard 
for the use of drones); at other times he lifted this 
designation again.97 In its last public statement, the 
Obama administration stated that the wording used 
in the AUMF – “forces associated with Al-Qaeda” – 
which applies to targets outside of areas of active 
hostilities, includes, in its view, the following groups: 
Al-Qaeda and the Taliban and certain allied groups 
in Afghanistan; Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
(especially in Yemen); Al-Shabab in Somalia; members 
of Al-Qaeda in Libya; Al-Qaeda in Syria; the so-called 
Islamic State.98 Who falls within the definition laid 
down in the AUMF has never been definitively resolved, 
so the executive’s interpretation of the authorization 
stands. By failing to intervene, the legislature and the 
judiciary de facto gave the president the opportunity 





95 Charlie Savage and Peter Baker, “Obama, in a Shift, to 
Limit Targets of Drone Strikes”, New York Times, 22 May 2013, 
https://nyti.ms/2nGjKfn. 
96 See Savage, Power Wars (see note 18), 245–49, 254–57. 
97 White House, “Report on the Legal and Policy Frame-
works” (see note 92), 25; Charlie Savage, “U.S. Removes Libya 
from List of Zones with Looser Rules for Drone Strikes”, New 
York Times, 20 January 2017, https://nyti.ms/2ka2hqJ. 
98 White House, “Report on the Legal and Policy Frame-
works” (see note 92), 5. 
99 A bipartisan bill introduced in the Senate in 2018 to 
replace the old authorization of military force with a new 
one, adopts this list and adds the Haqqani network and 
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb to it. See Jon Schwarz, 
“Cure Worse Than Disease: Bill to Restrict Trump’s War 
Powers Would Actually ‘Endorse a Worldwide War on Ter-
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Overall, Obama’s policy of targeted killings con-
firms the thesis of journalist Charlie Savage: that 
Obama was more interested in establishing formal 
justifications for this policy under the rule of law 
than in substantially strengthening civil and human 
rights. The bottom line is that, despite a more restric-
tive interpretation of the legal situation, Obama still 
found a legalistic way to justify any desired policy – 
including the order to use lethal force against anyone 
he considered a threat.100 
First trends under Trump 
According to press reports, President Trump has 
relaxed the rules of engagement. He is said to have 
declared regions in Yemen and Somalia as areas of 
active hostilities, where the lower standards of inter-
national humanitarian law apply and where the mili-
tary is allowed to carry out operations independent-
ly.101 In addition, in a document entitled “Principles, 
Standards, Procedures,” it is said that Trump has ex-
panded the scope of possible targets for killings out-
side of active combat zones. The preconditions to 
determine the existence of a “continuous, immediate 
threat” is said to have been loosened so that lower-
ranking members of terrorist organizations can be 
killed. Operations also no longer need to be approved 
by high-ranking members of the US government.102 
Obama’s efforts since 2013 to reduce the CIA’s role in 
drone operations also appear to have been reversed 
 
ror’”, The Intercept, 21 April 2018, https://theintercept.com/ 
2018/04/21/donald-trump-war-powers/. 
100 Thomas Gregory points out that in the US debate about 
targeted killings, the legal contributions do not have a mod-
erating effect on the use of force. The legal debate depoliti-
cizes the controversy about the appropriate use of force and 
delegitimizes the opposition. Thomas Gregory, “Drones, Tar-
geted Killings, and the Limitations of International Law”, 
International Political Sociology 9, no. 3 (2015): 197–212. 
101 Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Air Campaign in Yemen Killed 
Guantánamo Ex-Prisoner”, New York Times, 6 March 2017, 
https://nyti.ms/2n8dhXs; Charlie Savage and Eric Schmitt, 
“Trump Administration Is Said to Be Working to Loosen 
Counterterrorism Rules”, New York Times, 12 March 2017, 
https://nyti.ms/2mzNhoH; Charlie Savage and Eric Schmitt, 
“Trump Eases Combat Rules in Somalia Intended to Protect 
Civilians”, New York Times, 30 March 2017, https://nyti.ms/ 
2oCu6ds. 
102 Charlie Savage and Eric Schmitt, “Trump Poised to 
Drop Some Limits on Drone Strikes and Commando Raids”, 
New York Times, 21 September 2017, https://nyti.ms/2jRoPSa. 
by Trump. He is thinking about allowing the CIA to 
carry out drone missions once again, even in areas of 
active hostilities.103 
These changes have not yet been officially con-
firmed, and little is known about their practical im-
pacts. If the reports are correct, the measures will 
probably lead to an overall increase in air strikes and, 
inevitably, to more civilian casualties.104 However, 
they would not represent a fundamental departure 
from the rules currently in force. Trump is now using 
the flexible legal framework that the executive branch 
initially claimed under Bush for a more aggressive 
policy. That even the observers who were close to the 
Obama administration do not consider this to be very 
dramatic is another indication of the progressive nor-
malization of this endless war.105 It is also remarkable 
how little resistance the program has generated in the 
American public to date. Only human rights organi-
zations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights 
 
103 Gordon Lubold and Shane Harris, “Trump Broadens 
CIA Powers, Allows Deadly Drone Strikes”, Wall Street Journal, 
13 March 2017, http://on.wsj.com/2mlgyS9; Eric Schmitt and 
Matthew Rosenberg, “C.I.A. Wants Authority to Conduct 
Drone Strikes in Afghanistan for the First Time”, New York 
Times, 15 September 2017, https://nyti.ms/2y2BALJ. 
104 Whereas US Central Command in February 2017 esti-
mated the number of accidentally killed civilians in the fight 
against IS in Iraq and Syria (areas of active hostilities) to be 
199, in January of 2018, the estimate had already jumped 
to 831. US Central Command, “CJTF-OIR Monthly Civilian 
Casualty Report”, 25 January 2018, http://www.centcom.mil/ 
MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/News-Article-View/Article/1423091/ 
cjtf-oir-monthly-civilian-casualty-report; see also US Central 
Command, “CJTF-OIR Monthly Civilian Casualty Report”, 
2 February 2017, http://www.inherentresolve.mil/News/ 
Article/1068517/cjtf-oir-monthly-civilian-casualty-report/. 
According to these figures, almost three-quarters of the 
civilian casualties acknowledged by the military fall into 
Trump’s term. It should be noted, however, that the largest 
offensives against IS – the liberation of Raqqa and Mosul – 
happened during this period. The actual numbers are much 
higher. See Azmat Khan and Anand Gobal, “The Uncounted”, 
New York Times Magazine, 16 November 2017, https://nyti.ms/ 
2juNRXb; Samuel Oakford, “The U.S. Is in Denial about the 
Civilians It’s Killing in Syria”, Foreign Policy, 31 August 2017, 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/08/31/the-u-s-is-in-denial-about-
the-civilians-its-killing-in-syria/. For recent numbers, see 
https://airwars.org/. 
105 Luke Hartig, “New Drone Rules Ignore Trump Crazy 
Talk on Terrorism”, Newsweek, 22 September 2017, http:// 
www.newsweek.com/new-drone-rules-ignore-trump-crazy-
talk-terrorism-669516. 
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Watch, and the Open Society Institute have issued 
critical statements. Public opinion supports the drone 
program, and although experts question specific 
aspects of the program, such as signature strikes, they 
do not question the basic policy of targeted killings 
outside of combat areas.106 
 
106 On public opinion, see Alyssa Brown and Frank New-
port, “In U.S., 65% Support Drone Attacks on Terrorists 
Abroad”, Gallup, 25 March 2013, http://www.gallup.com/poll/ 
161474/support-drone-attacks-terrorists-abroad.aspx; “Public 
Continues to Back U.S. Drone Attacks”, Pew Research Center, 
28 May 2015, http://www.people-press.org/2015/05/28/public-
continues-to-back-u-s-drone-attacks/. On reform proposals, 
see Luke Hartig, The Drone Playbook (New York, NY: New 
America, August 2016), https://na-production.s3.amazonaws. 
com/documents/Drone_Playbook_Essay_8.16.pdf; Zenko, 
Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies (see note 79). 
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The experiences during 16 years of global war against 
terrorism show that the American system of “checks 
and balances” is not without flaws. In domestic poli-
tics, Congress and the courts keep the executive branch 
in check, and this system of “separated institutions 
sharing powers” (Richard Neustadt) often creates grid-
lock. On foreign policy, however, the executive branch 
enjoys a great level of autonomy, especially on mat-
ters of national security. When there is a strong feel-
ing of insecurity, the legislative and judicial branches 
are reluctant to limit executive power. 
In line with the saying “inter arma silent leges” 
(“when the weapons speak, the law falls silent”), US 
presidents have usually interpreted their powers ex-
pansively in times of war. Examples are the suspen-
sion of the right of habeas corpus by Abraham Lincoln 
during the American Civil War and the internment 
of US citizens of Japanese descent in camps during 
World War Two. In most cases, such extreme meas-
ures were ended when the wars did and – with some 
historical distance – were also considered to be mor-
ally wrong. However, the war on terror has no such 
clear end. 
When the Soviet Union became a major threat 
at the beginning of the Cold War, the US reacted by 
building up a national security state that shifted 
power among the branches of government to the exe-
cutive. With the exception of the State Department, 
all major institutions of the national security bureau-
cracy go back to the National Security Act of 1947.107 
The various services of the armed forces were inte-
grated under the Defense Department, which suc-
ceeded the War Department. The establishment of 
the National Security Council led to the prioritization 
of security considerations in the executive decision-
making process. Moreover, in turning the Office of 
 
107 See Douglas T. Stuart, Creating the National Security State. 
A History of the Law That Transformed America (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2008). 
Strategic Services (OSS) into the CIA, intelligence capa-
bilities initially created to conduct wartime reconnais-
sance of enemy forces were permanently institution-
alized. Industry and science were also recruited to con-
tribute to the effort to strengthen America’s defense 
capabilities. The executive branch, whose powers are 
enumerated only after Congress in the Constitution, 
was elevated in status and became the guardian of 
national security in charge of a newly established 
apparatus.108 
Expansion of the national security state 
after 9/11 
When the new dimension of terrorism became appar-
ent after 9/11, it led to a similar dynamic as during 
the rise of the Cold War in the late 1940s. Terrorism 
was perceived as an existential threat, which led to 
an unprecedented expansion of the security bureau-
cracy. 
Since the 17 agencies109 that make up the intelli-
gence community are financed from various budget 
lines, most of which are classified, exact figures on 
the cost are not available. In recent years, the base-
lines for the Military Intelligence Budget and the 
National Intelligence Budget, which covers the civil-
ian agencies (first among them the CIA), have been 
published. For the 2018 fiscal year, the request for 
the National Intelligence Budget was $57.7 billion 
and $20.7 billion for the Military Intelligence Budget; 
together, they exceed the amount approved for the 
previous year by around $5 billion, which is close to 
 
108 See Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace. The Origins of the Cold 
War and the National Security State (Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Books, 1977), 6. 
109 Depending on whether the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence is included in the count, there are 
references to 16 or 17 organizational units. 
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the 2010 record of $80.1 billion. Between 1997 and 
2010, the combined intelligence budget more than 
tripled from the original $26.6 billion.110 Within the 
CIA, the Counterterrorism Center grew from 300 to 
2,000 employees in the first 10 years after 9/11; it now 
accounts for 10 percent of the workforce. Of the CIA 
analysts, 20 percent work as “targeters” who look for 
key individuals in terrorist networks who can either 
be recruited or are designated for capture or kill-
ing.111 The Defense Intelligence Agency has grown 
from 7,500 employees in 2002 to 16,500 in 2010, and 
in the FBI, the number of persons dealing with 
terrorism has tripled.112 
In addition to the state bureaucracy, numerous pri-
vate companies are involved. In addition to the tra-
ditional defense industry, which has adapted to the 
newly emerging business of fighting terrorism, a num-
ber of new private contractors, particularly in the IT 
sector, provide services and profit financially from the 
war on terror. According to journalists Dana Priest 
and William Arkin, some 1,000 government agencies 
and 2,000 private companies are involved in the fight 
against terrorism at the federal level alone.113 They 
estimate that 854,000 people have a “top secret” 
security clearance.114 
The resulting web of organizations and agencies 
raises questions of coordination and control. The sys-
tem of compartmentalized secrecy and access to sen-
sitive information on a need-to-know basis makes 
effective supervision difficult and permits for mis-
 
110 The combined intelligence budget of 1997 became 
public through court records. With $26.6 billion it was at a 
historic low, after years of cuts in the wake of the so-called 
peace dividend after the end of the Cold War. Most likely, 
even before 9/11, the budget began to increase again. The 
baseline budgets of the National Intelligence Program and 
the Military Intelligence Program are published; they include 
most – but not all – of the money spent. See Federation 
of American Scientists, “Intelligence Budget Data”, FAS Intel-
ligence Resource Program, https://fas.org/irp/budget/; Anne 
Daugherty Miles, Intelligence Community Spending: Trends and 
Issues, CRS Report for Congress R44381 (Washington, D.C.: 
CRS, 8 November 2016). 
111 Greg Miller and Julie Tate, “CIA Shifts Focus to Killing 
Targets”, Washington Post, 1 September 2011, https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-shifts-focus-
to-killing-targets/2011/08/30/gIQA7MZGvJ_story.html. 
112 Priest and Arkin, Top Secret America (see note 14), 37. 
113 Priest and Arkin, Top Secret America (see note 14),  
86–87. 
114 Priest and Arkin, Top Secret America (see note 14), 158. 
conduct.115 In 2004, the position of Director of 
National Intelligence was created to better coordinate 
the various agencies. But the DNI has only a small 
staff, does not directly command the different agen-
cies, and has no control over their personnel policy. 
Only the CIA director reports directly to the DNI, and 
only the civilian part of the budget is under the DNI’s 
supervision. Beyond that, the various organizations 
each report to their respective departments. 
State of exception 
Following the traumatic experience of 9/11, not only 
did the security state grow, but the existing oversight 
system was also suspended. Although the US Consti-
tution was never formally suspended after the attacks 
in New York and Washington, there is much to sug-
gest that the situation in the first years after 9/11 re-
sembled a state of exception. In his book of the same 
name, the philosopher Giorgio Agamben describes 
the state of exception as “no man’s land between pub-
lic law and political fact, and between the juridical 
order and life.”116 He refers to a military order issued 
by the president on November 13, 2001, which cre-
ated the basis for the unlimited detention of foreign 
terror suspects and their trial by military commissions. 
In it, Bush decreed: “I have determined that an extra-
ordinary emergency exists for national defense pur-
poses, that this emergency constitutes an urgent and 
compelling government interest, and that issuance 
of this order is necessary to meet the emergency.”117  
 
115 Priest and Arkin (Top Secret America [see note 14]) give 
many examples of waste, problems with the chain-of-com-
mand, and the duplication of tasks. For example, persons 
involved in the so-called Special Access Programs in the De-
fense Department have to keep some information secret – 
even from their superiors – and the exchange of informa-
tion between different units is restricted. During the Cold 
War, such “hyper-compartmentalization” sometimes had the 
effect that some within intelligence agencies came to believe 
the propaganda and disinformation their colleagues had pro-
duced for the public. See Timothy Melley, The Covert Sphere. 
Secrecy, Fiction, and the National Security State (Ithaca, NY: Cor-
nell University Press, 2012), 61. 
116 Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (Chicago, IL: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press 2005), 1. 
117 Military Order of November 13, 2001 issued by George 
W. Bush, “Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism”, reprinted in The Tor-
ture Papers, ed. Greenberg and Dratel (see note 11), 25–28. 
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By declaring suspects unlawful 
combatants, they are denied 
basic human rights. 
The fact that the rule of law has effectively been 
suspended supports the argument that this situation 
constituted a state of exception.118 The situation made 
it possible to give orders, introduce rules, and estab-
lish procedures that are incompatible with funda-
mental principles of the rule of law, the US Constitu-
tion, and international law. The “black sites” and the 
detention center in Guantánamo created areas out-
side the law that were beyond the reach of the courts. 
In Guantánamo, to this day there are limits on the 
application of US law. By declaring suspects unlawful 
combatants, they are denied basic human rights. 
Moreover, by circumventing regular decision-making 
processes and operating in secret, checks both within 
the executive branch and between the branches are 
rendered ineffective.119 
Since this state of exception has never been offi-
cially declared, there is also no clear marker for end-
ing it. Civil society (press, NGOs, lawyers), government 
officials, the courts, and Congress have gradually 
exposed the problematic methods and forced the dis-
continuation of some of the most extreme practices 
through their resistance. At the same time, however, 
methods such as unlimited imprisonment and tar-
geted killing have been normalized and cemented in 
practice, despite political resistance. Other measures, 
 
118 See Agamben, State of Exception (see note 116), 1: “if ex-
ceptional measures are the result of periods of political crisis 
and, as such, must be understood on political and not juri-
dico-constitutional grounds [...], then they find themselves 
in the paradoxical position of being juridical measures that 
cannot be understood in legal terms, and the state of excep-
tion appears as the legal form of what cannot have a legal 
form.” 
119 Building on Agamben, Mark Danner identifies the state 
of exception based on eight policies: (1) declaring the war on 
terror; (2) defining this new war as unbounded in space and 
time; (3) redefining terrorists as unlawful combatants, thus 
depriving them of the protections of the laws of war; (4) im-
posing in both law enforcement and national security the so-
called preventive paradigm; (5) grounding the legitimacy of 
much of the state of exception on the president’s “inherent 
powers”; (6) making use, in multifarious and creative ways, 
of the power of secrecy; (7) improvising solutions, often ig-
noring expertise with amateurish results; (8) embedding the 
rhetoric of the war on terror in political struggle for partisan 
gains. See Mark Danner, Spiral. Trapped in the Forever War 
(New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2016), 21–23. 
such as mass surveillance, were even legally sanc-
tioned once they were discovered. As described above, 
the Obama administration had put those measures it 
wanted to continue on a more solid legal footing. 
This was accomplished either by providing new, more 
sophisticated interpretations of the law, or by con-
vincing Congress or the courts to support the policy. 
One contributing factor was that many critics of the 
Bush administration joined the Obama administra-
tion and thus ceased their criticism.120 Moreover, 
the Democrats in Congress, as well as some critical 
judges, trusted Obama – the constitutional lawyer 
and former Bush critic – more in this field. 
Despite all course corrections and new regulations, 
essential elements of the original state of emergency 
have gradually been institutionalized and become 
part of the new normal. This applies in particular to 
the war paradigm, the claim to executive power, and 
the excessive use of secrecy. 
Secrecy 
The excessive use of secrecy has not only given rise 
to inefficiencies in the bureaucracy of the national 
security state, but it also raises more fundamental 
problems. The clear violations of the law in the era 
immediately after 9/11 under the cover of secrecy 
have given way to a practice of exploiting legal gray 
areas. 
In principle, the separation of powers also applies 
in the fight against terrorism, and since the reforms 
of the 1970s, Congress has had relatively far-reaching 
oversight powers. Since 1980, the intelligence agen-
cies have been required by law to inform the Senate 
and House Intelligence Committees – newly created 
following the recommendations of the Church Com-
mittee – of all their activities, including covert 
operations.121 In practice, however, the members of 
 
120 Examples include Marty Lederman David Barron, who 
joined the Department of Justice, as well as Harold Koh, 
who as State Department Legal Advisor, defended Obama’s 
counter-terrorism policies. 
121 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1981, Pub. L. 
96-450, 14 October 1980. See also McCormick, American 
Foreign Policy and Process (see note 13), 416–24. McCormick 
(ibid., 418) points to the following as contributing factors in 
the growing interest of Congress in intelligence oversight: 
the fiasco of the Bay of Pigs invasion; the increase of covert 
operations during the Vietnam War; the CIA’s involvement 
in the destabilization of the Allende government in Chile; 
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the Committee are overwhelmed with holding in 
check a bureaucracy of tens of thousands of staff, a 
budget in the tens of billions, and hundreds of indi-
vidual programs and activities.122 In addition to a lack 
of time and resources – membership on the Intel-
ligence Committee is only one of many issue areas 
the lawmakers have to deal with – the classification 
rules represent a structural problem to effective over-
sight. Committee members may not share the infor-
mation they receive during classified hearings with 
outsiders, sometimes including their own staff. There-
fore, it is hardly possible to independently verify the 
claims made by the intelligence agencies. Even if 
there are indications of misconduct, for example if 
intelligence agencies do not tell the truth, members 
of Congress cannot simply go public.123 
The far-reaching authorization of the CIA in the 
wake of 9/11 to go after terrorists reduced to a mini-
mum the oversight within the executive branch as 
well as the sharing of information with Congress. 
With the blanket authorization of November 17, 
2001, the formal legal requirement for approval by 
the president and notification of Congress was ful-
 
the atmosphere after the Watergate affair with Congress 
emboldened to challenge the executive. 
122 Even some unclassified military anti-terror measures 
are apparently lost in the daily business. When four US 
troops were killed in Niger on 4 October 2017, several Sena-
tors, including Armed Services Committee member Lindsay 
Graham, admitted to not being aware of the extent of the 
US mission in Niger. Daniella Diaz, “Key Senators Say They 
Didn’t Know the US Had Troops in Niger”, CNN, 23 October 
2017, http://edition.cnn.com/2017/10/23/politics/niger-troops-
lawmakers/index.html. For more background, see Alexis 
Arieff et al., Niger: Frequently Asked Questions about the October 
2017 Attack on U.S. Soldiers, CRS Report for Congress R44995 
(Washington, D.C.: CRS, 27 October 2017). 
123 One example was the testimony of NSA Director James 
Clapper at a Senate Intelligence Committee hearing on 12 
March 2013. Asked by Senator Ron Wyden whether the NSA 
collected data on millions of Americans, Clapper denied this. 
Even though Wyden knew this to be false from confidential 
briefings he received as a member of the Judiciary Commit-
tee, he could not do much about it. In a letter, he asked 
Clapper to correct his statement. This was ignored by Clap-
per until the Snowden leaks revealed the truth. Janet Reit-
man, “Q&A: Senator Ron Wyden on NSA Surveillance and 




filled – without having to report individual opera-
tions to the relevant Committees.124 
Increasingly, the line between intelligence and 
military operations, which each take place under 
different statutory authorities, has been blurred; 
this trend continues to this day, posing special chal-
lenges.125 When clandestine activities take place in 
connection with ongoing hostilities, the military is 
not subject to the same requirements of presidential 
approval and notification of Congress as the CIA. Out-
side the obvious areas of conflict of Afghanistan, Iraq, 
and Syria, however, such a connection is not always 
clear. On the other hand, the CIA seems to have laxer 
rules on covert operations that violate the sovereignty 
of other states. Cooperation between the (formally 
civilian) CIA and the military units of the Joint Spe-
cial Operations Command, which are authorized to 
carry out operations in secret, has increased to such 
an extent that it is sometimes unclear to outsiders 
whether certain operations are carried out under 
the mandate for the intelligence services or that for 
military operations and what rules apply. Both CIA 
drones and military drones were apparently involved 
in the mission to kill US citizen Anwar Al-Awlaki in 
Yemen, but the operation was carried out according 
to CIA rules.126 The mission to kill Osama Bin Laden 
in Pakistan was carried out by Navy Seal Team Six 
(part of JSOC), which was placed under CIA command 
for the operation, probably because it violated Paki-
stan’s sovereignty.127 Overall, the creative combina-
tion of the various rules and regulations allows for 
maximum flexibility and minimum reporting obli-
gations. 
 
124 The CIA lawyer responsible for approving covert 
operations within the organization stated: “I had never 
in my experience been part of or ever seen a presidential 
authorization as far-reaching or as aggressive in scope. It 
was simply extraordinary.” Sarah Moughty, “John Rizzo: The 
Lawyer Who Approved CIA’s Most Controversial Programs”, 
PBS Frontline, 6 September 2011, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/ 
frontline/article/john-rizzo-the-lawyer-who-approved-cias-
most-controversial-programs/; see also Priest and Arkin, Top 
Secret America (see note 14), 12. 
125 See Chesney, “Military-Intelligence Convergence” 
(see note 13). 
126 Ibid., 617. 
127 Ibid., 539. 
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A congressional investigation accuses 
the CIA of misleading those elected to 
provide oversight. 
The Senate Intelligence Committee’s investigation 
into the CIA’s detention and interrogation program 
provides particular insight into the difficult relation-
ship between the legislative and executive branches 
– both in terms of the process of the investigation 
and its results. The Intelligence Committee’s com-
prehensive report not only examines the CIA’s actions, 
but it also accuses it of deliberately misleading those 
who are elected to conduct oversight.  
According to the report, even executive decision-
makers were not kept fully in the loop.128 The bru-
tality of the interrogation methods was systematically 
played down to the administration and Congress, 
while at the same time the method’s usefulness in 
 
128 For a critical assessment of the report, particularly 
on this point, see Robert Jervis, “The Torture Blame Game”, 
Foreign Affairs, May/June 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs. 
com/reviews/2015-04-20/torture-blame-game. 
The battle between the Senate and the CIA 
over the torture report 
  
On March 5, 2009, the Senate Select Committee on Intelli-
gence decided in a bipartisan vote to conduct a review of 
the CIA’s detention and interrogation program. Both the 
processes and the results of this review have since become 
the subject of a fierce dispute between the Committee and 
the CIA. About six months after the decision, the Repub-
licans on the Committee withdrew their support, allegedly 
because the attorney general’s investigation into the same 
matter made the Senate inquiry superfluous. After lengthy 
negotiations, the CIA granted Committee representatives 
access to 6.2 million pages of internal CIA documents by 
setting up a special computer system at a secure facility 
in Virginia. After years of work, the Committee produced 
a 6,000-page report – classified to this day – that called 
into question many of the CIA’s claims about the program. 
In the course of their research, Committee staff came 
across an internal CIA report – often referred to as the 
“Panetta Review,” named after the director at the time – 
whose conclusions contradicted the official CIA account 
that the brutal interrogations had contributed significant 
intelligence to the struggle against terrorism. The CIA 
maintained that it had not granted the Committee access 
to the Panetta Review. At least twice in 2010, it also deleted 
other documents that it had previously made available to 
the Committee from the file system. CIA staff also searched 
the computer drives on which Committee staff kept their 
own work results. When this came to the attention of the 
Committee chair on January 15, 2014, CIA Director John 
Brennan first denied the allegations, before admitting a 
few months later that the searches had taken place. The 
CIA, in turn, reported Committee staff to the FBI, accusing 
it of illegally accessing  documents and removing them 
from the facility. 
On March 11, 2014, Senator Dianne Feinstein went pub-
lic with serious allegations against the CIA.a Feinstein was 
the ranking member of the Committee and, in her former  
 position as Committee chair, had been a reliable supporter 
of the intelligence agencies. In a speech on the Senate 
floor, she now alleged that, in trying to obstruct the investi-
gation, the CIA had violated the principle of the separation 
of powers and the prohibition on conducting domestic sur-
veillance. Attorney General Eric Holder did not take sides 
in the conflict and announced in July 2014 that he would 
not take action against either the CIA or the Committee 
staff. CIA Inspector General David Buckley, after his own 
investigation, sided with the Senate. When a specially 
created Committee decided not to hold anyone in the CIA 
accountable for the events, Buckley resigned in protest. 
From December 2012 to December 2014, the Intelli-
gence Committee, the CIA, and the White House haggled 
over what results of the final report should be published. 
The Committee succeeded in publishing a 600-page, only 
slightly redacted summary of the report. It described in 
detail the origins and the cruelties of the interrogation 
program. Moreover, the report concluded: (1) the brutal 
interrogation methods were not effective in gathering in-
formation; (2) the CIA did not correctly inform decision-
makers and the public about the program; (3) there were 
serious failures in the management of the program; (4) the 
program was much more brutal than the CIA had admitted 
to decision-makers and the public. Even taking into ac-
count the Senators’ interests in playing down their own 
responsibility for the interrogation program, the impres-
sion remains that the CIA used every means at its disposal 
to prevent a highly critical, if not devastating, report about 
the CIA from seeing the light of day. 
 
a “Transcript: Sen. Dianne Feinstein Says CIA Searched 
Intelligence Committee Computers”, The Washington Post, 
11 March 2014, http://wapo.st/NWtFsa; Savage, Power 
Wars (see note 18), 512–15. 
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obtaining information was exaggerated. It is also part 
of the truth that the democratically elected leaders 
did not ask enough questions, presumably because 
they did not really want to know all the dirty de-
tails.129 But regardless of the report’s conclusions, 
the CIA’s attempt to influence those conclusions is 
very telling of how it sees its own role and exposes 
the methods it is willing to employ against US law-
makers. 
To protect its secrets, the government increasingly 
took action against those who passed information to 
the press. While in the past the Justice Department 
had not put much effort into investigating leaks, in 
2006 a task force of 12 prosecutors and 25 FBI em-
ployees was set up to prosecute those leaking clas-
sified information.130 During Obama’s presidency, the 
Department of Justice brought a total of nine cases 
for the publication of classified information – more 
than among all previous presidents put together. 
While some cases were taken over from the Bush 
administration and others newly initiated, many of 
the leakers were charged under the Espionage Act 
of 1917, which provides for particularly draconian 
punishments. The law was initially intended for 
enemy spies (as the name implies), but due to its 
imprecise wording, it can also be applied in cases 
where the publication of classified information may 
end up allowing enemies to benefit from that infor-
mation. The New York Times journalist James Risen 
was threatened with imprisonment under Obama for 
years for refusing to name his sources. In this context, 
a court ruled that journalists enjoy no special privi-
leges to protect their sources under the First Amend-
ment, which guarantees the right to freedom of 
speech. Charlie Savage noted that, as a result, the 
willingness of government sources to disclose clas-
sified information has declined significantly. He 
 
129 Senators and CIA officials give conflicting accounts on 
how much Congress knew. The CIA claims to have repeat-
edly briefed members of Congress on the use of enhanced in-
terrogation techniques. See Scott Shane and Carl Hulse, “List 
Says Top Democrats Were Briefed on Interrogations”, New 
York Times, 8 May 2009, https://nyti.ms/2Krb4RT; Marc Am-
binder, “What Pelosi Knew”, The Atlantic, 8 May 2009, https:// 
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2009/05/what-pelosi-
knew/17309/. 
130 On this and the following, see James Risen, “The 
Biggest Secret. My Life As a New York Times Reporter in the 
Shadow of the War on Terror”, The Intercept, 3 January 2018, 
https://interc.pt/2Cx81Zx; Savage, Power Wars (see note 18), 
350–414. 
partly attributes to this development the fact that 
NSA surveillance was not uncovered before the 
Snowden leaks. In the first such case during the 
Trump administration, NSA contractor Reality 
Winner was recently sentenced to 63 months in 
prison for passing on a classified document to a 
media outlet. Again, she was charged under the 
Espionage Act, even though the leaked information 
was redacted before publication.131 Overall, there 
has been a significant change since 9/11. Whereas 
prosecutors were previously very reluctant to force 
reporters to disclose their sources – and virtually no 
one was ever convicted of publishing classified infor-
mation – both are now firmly established practices. 
Impunity 
The normalization of controversial methods has also 
been helped by the fact that no one has been held 
accountable for violations of the law that have oc-
curred. Those responsible for the use of torture acted 
with impunity – a persistent breach of the UN Con-
vention against Torture, which Washington has 
ratified, obliging states to prosecute violations of the 
provision on the prohibition of torture.132 Not only 
were there no criminal charges, but also no discipli-
nary measures. Those responsible were able to con-
tinue their careers.133 After Obama’s election, the 
 
131 Trevor Timm, “The Government’s Argument That 
Reality Winner Harmed National Security Doesn’t Hold Up”, 
The Intercept, 23 August 2018, https://interc.pt/2N87X3w. 
132 The fact that no serious attempt was made to establish 
accountability prompted the prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Court to ask for an investigation on possible crimes 
committed by US personnel in Afghanistan, a move that, 
in turn, has provoked harsh criticism and threats against the 
court by the Trump administration. See John Bolton, “Pro-
tecting American Constitutionalism and Sovereignty from 
International Threats”, remarks delivered to the Federalist 
Society, 10 September 2018, available at http://www. 
lawfareblog.com/national-security-adviser-john-bolton-
remarks-federalist-society. 
133 This is true on almost all levels. Jay Bybee, who in the 
Justice Department was responsible for the greenlighting 
of torture, was appointed as a federal judge for life in 2003 
(before the torture memos became public). John Yoo, who 
authored many of the torture memos, remains professor of 
law at the University of California at Berkeley. Dick Cheney’s 
legal counsel David Addington became vice president for 
research at the Heritage Foundation; Gina Haspel, who led a 
black site in Thailand, where prisoners were tortured, was 
 Impunity 
 SWP Berlin 
 From Exception to Normalcy: 
 The United States and the War on Terrorism 
 October 2018 
 35 
Justice Department started investigations, which were 
soon closed again without any charges being filed. 
The likely reason was that the Obama administration 
did not want to antagonize the intelligence commu-
nity. Conflicts with advocates of “enhanced interroga-
tion techniques” in Congress, the Republican Party, 
and the security establishment could have derailed 
the entire agenda of the newly elected president. 
Nevertheless, foregoing any accountability has 
caused permanent damage to the norm outlawing 
torture, even after the problematic practices were 
ended. The advocacy of torture remains an acceptable 
position in mainstream discourse. Not only did 
Donald Trump speak approvingly of the use of tor-
ture, presidential candidate Mitt Romney in the 2012 
election campaign also spoke out in favor of advanced 
interrogation techniques. During the 2016 election 
campaign, the majority of Republican candidates 
advocated reintroducing them. Without any sign of 
regret, ex-Vice President Cheney criticizes the renun-
ciation of torture at every opportunity, and Bruce 
Jessen, the psychologist mainly responsible for the 
development of interrogation techniques, aggressively 
defends his actions. In film and on television, scenes 
in which American intelligence agents engage in tor-
ture now belong to the standard repertoire of screen-
writers.134 
 
appointed to the position of CIA Director by Donald Trump. 
Even CIA employees whose failures caused the torture of 
innocents and even to deaths among detainees did not face 
disciplinary consequences. One notable exception are the 
11 low-ranking soldiers who were convicted, some to prison 
terms, for their involvement in the Abu Ghraib scandal. See 
Adam Goldman and Matt Apuzzo, “CIA Officers Make Grave 
Mistakes, Get Promoted”, NBC News, 9 February 2011, http:// 
www.nbcnews.com/id/41484983/ns/us_news-security/t/cia-
officers-make-grave-mistakes-get-promoted/. 
134 See e.g. Robert Cochran and Joel Surnow, 24 (Los 
Angeles: 20th Century Fox, 2001–2010); Pierre Morel, Taken 
(Los Angeles: 20th Century Fox, 2008); Gregor Jordan, Un-
thinkable (Culver City: Sony Pictures Home Entertainment, 
2010); Daniél Espinosa, Safe House (New York, NY: Universal 
Pictures, 2012). 
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In the Trump era, the US war on terrorism does not 
seem to be the most pressing issue on the transatlan-
tic agenda. However, it is a phenomenon that is not 
limited to one president or one party. If Europeans 
take Trump’s presidency as an opportunity to reflect 
more generally on their strong dependence on the 
United States, they should also include the issue of 
how to deal with terrorism in their considerations. 
The question is to what extent European states, and 
in particular Germany, are prepared to continue 
to support the controversial approach of the US in 
fighting terrorism. 
The immediate and existential threat following the 
attacks of 9/11 has passed, and yet terrorism contin-
ues to hold a central place in the American percep-
tion of its security environment. The limited successes 
in this war so far have been primarily tactical. No cost 
has been spared, and many compromises of principles 
and ideals have been accepted in order to prevent ter-
rorist attacks, even if the danger is not very concrete, 
and despite the fact that – in terms of statistics – 
the security risk that jihadist terrorism poses to West-
ern societies is relatively low. Despite all the differ-
ences between Trump’s administration and the Bush 
and Obama administrations, in the war on terror, 
continuity prevails. Following Obama’s time in the 
White House, many controversial methods are now 
more firmly institutionalized than ever before. 
Policies introduced for exceptional situations have 
become the standard. 
That there is no end in sight to this war is also due 
to the fact that Congress has allowed the executive to 
extend its methods to ever-new groups and territories. 
Right after 9/11, Congress refused to issue the presi-
dent carte blanche. The original White House draft 
resolution for the AUMF requested legal authoriza-
tion for the president “to deter and pre-empt any 
future acts of terrorism or aggression against the 
United States.”135 Congress denied this general 
authorization and limited the authorization to those 
responsible for 9/11 and associated forces. Since then, 
there have been debates as to whether a new legal 
basis is necessary because the situation has evolved. 
Paradoxically, some of the drafts now under discus-
sion, which seek to adapt and renew the authoriza-
tion of military force, are even broader in scope. For 
example, a bipartisan bill introduced in the Senate 
would codify the executive’s interpretation of who is 
an “associated force,” and thus a legitimate target of 
military force. The draft not only mentions numerous 
groups that only emerged after 9/11, but also leaves 
it to the president to designate further groups.136 
In discourse about national security, the terrorist 
threat is now being overshadowed by new challenges. 
Due to Russia’s aggressive policy and China’s assertive 
stance, the return of rivalries among the great powers 
is being discussed more and more.137 In the sense that 
terrorism dominates the strategic debate, the post-
9/11 era is coming to an end. However, this does not 
mean the end of the war against terrorism, which to 
some degree has always taken place in the shadows. 
New challenges will certainly lead to adjustments. The 
US military’s procurement policy is already changing 
– away from hardware for counter-insurgency opera-
tions and toward the requirements for interstate con-
flicts. Such a reorientation is more difficult to detect 
in the intelligence services because of the secrecy of 
their use of resources. However, it can be assumed 
 
135 See Grimmet, Authorization for Use of Military Force in 
Response to the 9/11 Attacks (see note 6). 
136 Schwarz, “Cure Worse Than Disease” (see note 99). 
137 According to the National Defense Strategy of 2018, 
“Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the 
primary concern in U.S. national security”. Department of 
Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy 
of the United States of America”, 1, https://www.defense.gov/ 
Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-
Summary.pdf. 
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that more personnel will also be deployed in the 
future to analyze developments in China and Russia, 
especially since Moscow’s interference in the US elec-
tion campaign in 2016 caught the intelligence ser-
vices largely unprepared – despite the surveillance 
powers created over the previous 15 years.138 
Western democracies have under-
mined their credibility in the com-
petition with authoritarian systems. 
However, the new type of anti-terrorism fight can 
be conducted with fewer resources, partly because 
armed drones are a comparatively cheap instrument. 
A new drone base is currently being completed in 
Niger for $110 million, which will enable the US to 
reach large parts of West and North Africa in the 
future. The number of US troops active in Niger has 
grown from 40 soldiers in 2013 to around 800 at 
present. American special forces, such as the Army’s 
Green Berets, operate largely outside the public eye 
in ever-new places, from the Nigerian-Malian to the 
Saudi-Yemeni borders. The activities of the US special 
forces in training security forces in states such as 
Burkina Faso and Cameroon, which currently have a 
budget of around $100 million, are also continu-
ing.139 
With regard to future geopolitical conflicts with 
China and Russia, Western democracies have done 
themselves no favors by normalizing behavior that 
violates long-standing norms. In the competition 
between democracies and authoritarian systems, 
which also takes place with respect to value systems 
and soft power, the weakening of norms has under-
mined the West’s credibility. The idea of integrating 
other states – and in particular emerging powers – 
into existing norms and legal systems suffers when 
one can be charged with hypocrisy. There are plenty 
 
138 Dana Priest, “Russia’s Election Meddling Is Another 
American Intelligence Failure”, The New Yorker, 13 November 
2017, https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/russias-
election-meddling-is-another-american-intelligence-failure. 
139 Eric Schmitt, “A Shadowy War’s Newest Front: A Drone 
Base Rising from Saharan Dust”, New York Times, 22 April 
2018, https://nyti.ms/2HjkxhB; Joe Penny, “Africa, Latest 
Theater in America’s Endless War”, New York Review of Books 
Daily, 12 March 2018, http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/ 
03/12/africa-latest-theater-in-americas-endless-war/; Helene 
Cooper et al., “Army Special Forces Secretly Help Saudis 
Combat Threat from Yemen Rebels”, New York Times, 3 May 
2018, https://nyti.ms/2HI2f9Q. 
of examples of this dynamic. After Snowden revealed 
the extent of NSA surveillance, it became much more 
difficult to call out China’s hacking in its attempt to 
acquire industrial secrets. Criticism of the “little green 
men” Moscow has sent to Ukraine and Syria is also 
more convincing if one does not send one’s own 
special forces to hunt down terrorists in faraway 
places – while sometimes also not wearing uniforms 
with clearly identifiable insignia or having the gov-
ernment not accept responsibility for their opera-
tions. 
Of course, the global commitment to human rights 
and the rule of law suffers the most. Governments of 
all kinds have quickly learned to put their own strug-
gles against political opponents under the banner of 
“fighting terrorism.” Russia once “fought terrorists” 
in Chechnya and is now doing so in Syria; China uses 
the same rhetoric when it persecutes Uighurs.140 
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan now 
routinely accuses unpopular journalists of “support-
ing terrorism” in order to justify their imprisonment. 
Although even under the best circumstances any 
outsider’s ability to influence dictators such as Abdel 
Fattah al-Sisi in Egypt or Bashar al-Assad in Syria is 
in doubt, the struggle against torture is more difficult, 
since their secret services have previously tortured 
on behalf of the US. The events of 2003 in the Iraqi 
prison of Abu Ghraib, which was already notorious 
for torture at the time of Saddam Hussein, represents 
perhaps the greatest missed opportunity to establish 
a new awareness of human rights after the regime 
change in Iraq. The European Union’s policy of en-
abling the security forces of various North African 
countries to curb migration to Europe through train-
ing and equipment is problematic in any case, due 
to the lack of the rule of law in many partner states. 
Convincing these countries to treat migrants humanely 
is not made easier by the Western approach to the 
issue of terrorism. 
President Trump has repeatedly stated publicly 
that human rights are no longer a priority for US 
foreign policy. He has thus adjusted his declaratory 
policy to more closely resemble the actual practice. 
We can only hope that the United States, under a new 
administration, will return to promoting a strong 
commitment to human rights. However, the war on 
 
140 Mehdi Hasan, “One Million Muslim Uighurs Have Been 
Detained by China, the U.N. Says. Where’s the Global Out-
rage?”, The Intercept, 13 August 2018, https://interc.pt/2MlBNo6. 
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terror, conducted outside of the traditional normative 
framework, would be a major obstacle. 
If European governments wish to maintain human 
rights advocacy as a foreign policy goal, they should 
not be silent in the face of violations. In the early 
years of the global war on terror, US methods were 
strongly criticized by Europe’s governments. This has 
now largely ceased. It is not clear whether this is 
due to the fact that Europeans are now increasingly 
experiencing terrorist attacks of their own, whether 
they became less critical out of understanding or 
sympathy for the Obama administration, or whether 
they have simply become accustomed. In any case, 
little of what prompted the initial criticism has 
changed. To tolerate – or even adopt – such prob-
lematic methods is not only contrary to Europe’s 
claim of being a guardian of the rule of law and human 
rights. It also carries the risk of a return to even worse 
episodes in the war on terrorism. Trump’s election 
illustrates how shortsighted it is to trust in the judg-
ment of the man occupying the White House – as 
the Europeans did with Obama. Even in the best 
hands, too much power creates potential for abuse. 
Only strong laws, institutions, and norms can pre-
vent this. 
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AUMF Authorization for Use of Military Force 
CIA Central Intelligence Agency 
CRS Congressional Research Service 
DNI Director of National Intelligence 
FAA FISA Amendments Act 
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FISA Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
G-SAVE Global Struggle Against Violent Extremism 
GWAT Global War On Terror 
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross 
JSOC Joint Special Operations Command 
MCA Military Commissions Act 
NSA National Security Agency 
OLC Office of Legal Counsel (US Justice Department) 
PCLOB Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board 
SERE Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape 
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
US United States 
 
Abbreviations 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
